Philosophie, philosophy, filosofia, filosofía, φιλοσοφία, philosophia, philosophía
Philosophía é a correspondência (Entsprechen) propriamente exercida, que fala na medida em que é dócil ao apelo do ser do ente (Zuspruch des Seins des Seienden). O corresponder (Ent-sprechen) escuta a voz do apelo (Stimme des Zuspruchs). O que como voz do ser (Stimme des Seins) se dirige a nós dis-põe (be-stimmt) nosso corresponder. “Co-responder” significa então: ser dis-posto, être dis-posé, a saber, a partir do ser do ente (Sein des Seienden). Dis-posé significa aqui literalmente: ex-posto (auseinander-gesetzt), iluminado (gelichtet) e com isto entregue ao serviço (Bezüge) daquilo que é. O ente enquanto tal dis-põe de tal maneira o falar que o dizer (Sagen) se harmoniza (abstimmt) (accorder) como o ser do ente. O corresponder é, necessariamente e sempre e não apenas ocasionalmente e de vez em quando, um corresponder dis-posto. Ele está numa disposição (Gestimmtheit). E só com base na dis-posição (dis-position) o dizer da correspondência recebe sua precisão, sua vocação (Be-stimmtheit).
Enquanto dis-posta e con-vocada, a correspondência é essencialmente uma dis-posição (Stimmung). Por isso o nosso comportamento (Verhalten) é cada vez dis-posto desta ou daquela maneira. A dis-posição não é um concerto de sentimentos (Gefühlen) que emergem casualmente, que apenas acompanham a correspondência. Se caracterizamos a filosofia como a correspondência dis-posta, não-posta, não é absolutamente intenção nessa entregar o pensamento às mudanças fortuitas e vacilações de estados de ânimo (Gefühlszuständen). Antes, trata-se unicamente de apontar para o fato de que toda precisão do dizer se funda numa disposição da correspondência, da correspondance, digo eu, à escuta do apelo (Zuspruch).
Antes de mais nada, porém, convém notar que a referência à essencial dis-posição da correspondência (Gestimmtheit des Entsprechens) não é uma invenção apenas de nossos dias. Já os pensadores gregos, Platão e Aristóteles, chamaram a atenção para o fato de que a filosofia e o filosofar fazem parte de uma dimensão do homem, que designamos dis-posição (no sentido de uma tonalidade afetiva que nos harmoniza e nos convoca por um apelo (im Sinne der Ge-stimmtheit und Be-stimmtheit)). (GA11:21-22; tr. Ernildo Stein)
VIDE: (Philosophie->http://hyperlexikon.hyperlogos.info/modules/lexikon/search.php?option=1&term=Philoso); (Filosofia->http://hyperlexikon.hyperlogos.info/modules/lexikon/search.php?option=1&term=filoso)
philosophie
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philosophy
NT: Philosophy (Philosophie), 6, 13, 27, 38, 45, 50 n. 10, 208, 213, 229, 310, 436, et passim; “the business of philosophers,” 4, 23, 220 (Kant); ‘the scandal of philosophy’, 203, 205 (Kant); of culture, 167; of history, 402 (Yorck); of language, 166; of life, 46, 48, 398, 403; of Nature, 432 n. 30 (Hegel); and the occurrence of being, 268fn; essence of philosophizing, 268fn. See also Hermeneutics; Ontology; Phenomenology (BTJS)
Before we conclude this general survey, it is worth-while calling attention to the fact that an authentic response to the appeal of Being (Sein) is precisely what Heidegger understands by “philosophy.” He develops the point in an address to the philosophers of France in 1955. (GA11, Wes ist das – die Philosophie?)
The word appeared for the first time, the author claims, in Heraclitus, and there as an adjective rather than as a noun, describing the man who φιλεῖ τὸ σοφόν. φιλεῖ (philia) is interpreted to mean “respond,” and σοφόν (sophon) to mean ἔν-πάντα (hen-panta), sc. Being-as-λόγος (logos) (ἔν (hen)), insofar as it gathers together beings (Seienden) (πάντα (panta)) unto themselves and lets them be. During the era of sophistry, both appeal and response took different forms. Then the mystery of Being (Sein) in beings (Seienden) disclosed itself to the true thinker as threatened by the crass charlatanism of the sophists. In such a situation the authentic response was to try to salvage Being (Sein) from this fallen condition, hence to strive after Being (Sein) in beings (Seienden) beyond the level of every-dayness (Alltäglichkeit). The fundamental drive was an ἔρως (eros). To Aristotle, the Being-to-be-sought disclosed itself as the being-ness (Seiendheit) (ουσία) of beings (Seienden), and responding to it he posed the question: τί τὸ ὄν ᾗ ὄν? (ti to on he on; GA11, Wes ist das – die Philosophie?, pp. 21-22 (Heraclitus), 23-24 (Sophists), 24-25 (Aristotle).)
Now Heidegger’s thesis is that what the occidental man traditionally has called “philosophy” is precisely that striving after the Being of beings (Sein des Seienden) that implies a passage beyond the sensible (physical) to the supra-sensible and begins with Plato. We can see, then, that for Western thought (Denken) philosophy, as we know it, is identified with metaphysics (Metaphysik), so that when Aristotle comes to define philosophy, the result is the classic definition of metaphysics (Metaphysik): ἐπιστήμη τῶν πρώτων ἀρχών καὶ αἰτιών θεωρητική. Paraphrasing in Heidegger’s sense, we take this to mean: philosophy is that endowment in man (ἐπιστήμη (episteme)) by which he can catch and hold in view (θεωρητική (theoretike)) beings (Seienden) in that by which they are as beings (Seienden) (ἀρχών (archon), αἰτιών (aition)). No one will doubt, least of all Heidegger, that this conception of philosophy is a legitimate one. What makes it so, however, is not that it crystallizes once and for all the meaning of metaphysics (Metaphysik), but that it is an authentic response by Aristotle to the address of Being (Sein) to him. The author insists, however, that the historic formula is only one way of conceiving the correlation of address-response between Being (Sein) and man. It is helpless, for example, to express this correlation as it came-to-pass in Heraclitus and Parmenides. Why, then, absolutize it? Being (Sein) remains after Aristotle, as before, eminently “free” to address itself to man in some other type of mittence (Geschick), articulated in some other way. (GA11, Wes ist das – die Philosophie?, pp. 25-27 (ἐπιστήμη. . .), 28-29 (freie Folge). The word “free” here has a polemical connotation, directed against the Hegelian notion according to which the mittences (Geschick) of Being (Sein) would be determined by a dialectical necessity. Cf. p. 31.) If we, for our part, remain docile to Being (Sein), which in the Aristotelian tradition imparted itself as metaphysics (Metaphysik), are we not after all – indeed in a very original way – still “philosophical”?
During the course of Heidegger’s development, he uses the word “philosophy” sometimes in the narrow sense, by which it is identified with metaphysics (Metaphysik), sometimes in the broad sense, as a response to Being (Sein)’s appeal. In the first case, it shares the same destiny as metaphysics (Metaphysik) and must be overcome. In the second, it is a consummation devoutly to be wished. (V.g. GA9, Platons Lehre von der Wahrheit, p. 48 (narrow sense); GA36-37, p. 24 (broad sense).) We make no attempt to retain the problematic beyond calling attention to it here. Let it suffice to say that in disengaging the sense of foundational thought (wesentliche Denken), we delineate Heidegger’s conception of philosophy as well. For there is only one philosophical question that interests him, the question about Being (Sein) and its truth (Wahrheit). This is the “one star” – the only – that remains constant along the way. (“Auf einen Stern zugehen, nur dieses….’’; GA13:7, Aus der Erfahrung des Denkens) It is, one might think (Denken), the evening star that must have caught his eye when, in the gathering darkness of Reichenau, he watched the light go out of the west. (RHPT:23-24)