mode

Modus, modal, modifizieren

If the question about Being is to be explicitly formulated and carried through in such a manner as to be completely transparent to itself, then any treatment of it in line with the elucidations we have given requires us to explain how Being is to be looked at, how its meaning is to be understood and conceptually grasped; it requires us to prepare the way for choosing the right entity for our example, and to work out the genuine way of access to it. Looking at something, understanding and conceiving it, choosing, access to it – all these ways of behaving are constitutive for our inquiry, and therefore are MODES of Being for those particular entities which we, the inquirers, are ourselves. Thus to work out the question of Being adequately, we must make an entity – the inquirer – transparent in his own Being. The very asking of this question is an entity’s MODE of Being; and as such it gets its essential character from what is inquired about – namely, Being. This entity which each of us is himself and which includes inquiring as one of the possibilities of its Being, we shall denote by the term “Dasein”. If we are to formulate our question explicitly and transparently, we must first give a proper explication of an entity (Dasein), with regard to its Being. BTMR §2

In the question of the meaning of Being there is no ‘circular reasoning’ but rather a remarkable ‘relatedness backward or forward’ which what we are asking about (Being) bears to the inquiry itself as a MODE of Being of an entity. Here what is asked about has an essential pertinence to the inquiry itself, and this belongs to the ownmost meaning (eigensten Sinn) of the question of Being. This only means, however, that there is a way – perhaps even a very special one – in which entities with the character of Dasein are related to the question of Being. But have we not thus demonstrated that a certain kind of entity has a priority with regard to its Being? And have we not thus presented that entity which shall serve as the primary example to be interrogated in the question of Being? So far our discussion has not demonstrated Dasein’s priority, nor has it shown decisively whether Dasein may possibly or even necessarily serve as the primary entity to be interrogated. But indeed something like a priority of Dasein has announced itself. BTMR §2

This elemental historicality of Dasein may remain hidden from Dasein itself. But there is a way by which it can be discovered and given proper attention. Dasein can discover tradition, preserve it, and study it explicitly. The discovery of tradition and the disclosure of what it ‘transmits’ and how this is transmitted, can be taken hold of as a task in its own right. In this way Dasein brings itself into the kind, of Being which consists in histoiriological inquiry and research. But historiology – or more precisely historicity – is possible as a kind of Being which the inquiring Dasein may possess, only because historicality is a determining characteristic for Dasein in the very basis of its Being. If this historicality remains hidden from Dasein, and as long as it so remains, Dasein is also denied the possibility of historiological inquiry or the discovery of history. If historiology is wanting, this is not evidence against Dasein’s historicality; on the contrary, as a deficient MODE of this state of Being, it is evidence for it. Only because it is ‘historical’ can an era be unhistoriological. BTMR §6

Everyone who is acquainted with the middle ages sees that Descartes is ‘dependent’ upon medieval scholasticism and employs its terminology. But with this ‘discovery’ nothing is achieved philosophically as long as it remains obscure to what a profound extent the medieval ontology has influenced the way in which posterity has determined or failed to determine the ontological character of the res cogitans. The full extent of this cannot be estimated until both the meaning and the limitations of the ancient ontology have been exhibited in terms of an orientation directed towards the question of Being. In other words, in our process of destruction we find ourselves faced with the task of Interpreting the basis of the ancient ontology in the light of the problematic of Temporality. When this is done, it will be manifest that the ancient way of interpreting the Being of entities is oriented towards the ‘world’ or ‘Nature’ in the widest sense, and that it is indeed in terms of ‘time’ that its understanding of Being is obtained. The outward evidence for this (though of course it is merely outward evidence) is the treatment of the meaning of Being as parousia or ousia, which signifies, in ontologico-Temporal terms, ‘presence’ (“Anwesenheit”). Entities are grasped in their Being as ‘presence’; this means that they are understood with regard to a definite MODE of time – the ‘Present’ BTMR §6

logos as “discourse” means rather the same as deloun: to make manifest what one is ‘talking about’ in one’s discourse. Aristotle has explicated this function of discourse more precisely as apophainesthai. The logos lets something be seen (phainesthai), namely, what the discourse is about; and it does so either for the one who is doing the talking (the medium) or for persons who are talking with one another, as the case may be. Discourse ‘lets something be seen’ apo …: that is, it lets us see something from the very thing which the discourse is about. In discourse (apophansis), so far as it is genuine, what is said (was geredet ist) is drawn from what the talk is about, so that discursive communication, in what it says (in ihrem Gesagten), makes manifest what it is talking about, and thus makes this accessible to the other party. This is the structure of the logos as apophansis. This MODE of making manifest in the sense of letting something be seen by pointing it out, does not go with all kinds of ‘discourse’. Requesting (euche), for instance, also makes manifest, but in a different way. BTMR §7

But because ‘truth’ has this meaning, and because the logos is a definite MODE of letting something be seen, the logos is just not the kind of thing that can be considered as the primary ‘locus’ of truth. If, as has become quite customary nowadays, one defines “truth” as something that ‘really’ pertains to judgment, and if one then invokes the support of Aristotle with this thesis, not only is this unjustified, but, above all, the Greek conception of truth has been misunderstood. aisthesis, the sheer sensory perception of something, is ‘true’ in the Greek sense, and indeed more primordially than the logos which we have been discussing. Just as seeing aims at colours, any aisthesis aims at its idia (those entities which are genuinely accessible only through it and for it); and to that extent this perception is always true. This means that seeing always discovers colours, and hearing always discovers sounds. Pure noein is the perception of the simplest determinate ways of Being which entities as such may possess, and it perceives them just by looking at them. This noein is what is ‘true’ in the purest and most primordial sense; that is to say, it merely discovers, and it does so in such a way that it can never cover up. This noein can never cover up; it can never be false; it can at worst remain a non-perceiving, agnoein, not sufficing for straightforward and appropriate access. BTMR §7

The way in which Being and its structures are encountered in the MODE of phenomenon is one which must first of all be wrested from the objects of phenomenology. Thus the very point of departure (Ausgang) for our analysis requires that it be secured by the proper method, just as much as does our access (Zugang) to the phenomenon, or our passage (Durchgang) through whatever is prevalently covering it up. The idea of grasping and explicating phenomena in a way which is ‘original’ and ‘intuitive’ (“originären” und “intuitiven”) is directly opposed to the na naïveté of a haphazard, ‘immediate’, and unreflective ‘beholding. (“Schauen”). (SZ:37) BTMR §7

Dasein’s average everydayness, however, is not to be taken as a mere ‘aspect’. Here too, and even in the MODE of inauthenticity, the structure of existentiality lies a priori. And here too Dasein’s Being is an issue for it in a definite way; and Dasein comports itself towards it in the MODE of average everydayness, even if this is only the MODE of fleeing in the face of it and forgetfulness thereof. BTMR §9

The Interpretation of Dasein in its everydayness, however, is not identical with the describing of some primitive stage of Dasein with which we can become acquainted empirically through the medium of anthropology. Everydayness does not coincide with primitiveness, but is rather a MODE of Dasein’s Being, even when that Dasein is active in a highly developed and differentiated culture – and precisely then. Moreover, even primitive Dasein has possibilities of a Being which is not of the everyday kind, and it has a specific everydayness of its own. To orient the analysis of Dasein towards the ‘life of primitive peoples’ can have positive significance (Bedeutung) as a method because ‘primitive phenomena’ are often less concealed and less complicated by extensive self-interpretation on the part of the Dasein in question. Primitive Dasein often speaks to us more directly in terms of a primordial absorption in ‘phenomena’ (taken in a pre-phenomenological sense). A way of conceiving things which seems, perhaps, rather clumsy and crude from our standpoint, can be positively helpful in bringing out the ontological structures of phenomena in a genuine way. (SZ:51) BTMR §11

Second, that entity which in every case has Being-in-the-world as the way in which it is. Here we are seeking that which one inquires into when one asks the question ‘Who?’ By a phenomenological demonstration we shall determine who is in the MODE of Dasein’s average everydayness. (See the fourth chapter of this Division.) BTMR §12

Both in Dasein and for it, this state of Being is always in some way familiar (bekannt). Now if it is also to become known (erkannt), the knowing which such a task explicitly implies takes itself (as a knowing of the world (Welterkennen)) as the chief exemplification of the ‘soul’s’ relationship to the world. Knowing the world (noein) – or rather addressing oneself to the ‘world’ and discussing it (logos) – thus functions as the primary MODE of Being-in-the-world, even though Being-in-the-world does not as such get conceived. But because this structure of Being remains ontologically inaccessible, yet is experienced ontically as a ‘relationship’ between one entity (the world) and another (the soul), and because one proximally understands Being by taking entities as entities within-the-world for one’s ontological foothold, one tries to conceive the relationship between world and soul as grounded in these two entities (SZ:59) themselves and in the meaning of their Being – namely, to conceive it as Being-present-at-hand. And even though Being-in-the-world is something of which one has pre-phenomenological experience and acquaintance (erfahren und gekannt), it becomes invisible if one interprets it in a way which is ontologically inappropriate. This state of Dasein’s Being is now one with which one is just barely acquainted (and indeed as something obvious), with the stamp of an inappropriate interpretation. So in this way it becomes the ‘evident’ point of departure for problems of epistemology or the ‘metaphysics of knowledge’. For what is more obvious than that a ‘subject’ is related to an ‘Object’ and vice versa? This ‘subject-Object-relationship’ must be presupposed. But while this presupposition is unimpeachable in its facticity, this makes it indeed a baleful one, if its ontological necessity and especially its ontological meaning are to be left in the dark. BTMR §12

§13. A Founded MODE in which Being-in is Exemplified. Knowing the World. BTMR §13

If Being-in-the-world is a basic state of Dasein, and one in which Dasein operates not only in general but pre-eminently in the MODE of everydayness, then it must also be something which has always been experienced ontically. It would be unintelligible for Being-in-the-world to remain totally veiled from view, especially since Dasein has at its disposal an understanding of its own Being, no matter how indefinitely this understanding may function. But no sooner was the ‘phenomenon of knowing the world’ grasped than it got interpreted in a ‘superficial’, (SZ:60) formal manner. The evidence for this is the procedure (still customary today) of setting up knowing as a ‘relation between subject and Object’ – a procedure in which there lurks as much ‘truth’ as vacuity. But subject and Object do not coincide with Dasein and the world. BTMR §13

With this kind of approach one remains blind to what is already tacitly implied even when one takes the phenomenon of knowing as one’s theme in the most provisional manner: namely, that knowing is a MODE of Being of Dasein as Being-in-the-world, and is founded ontically upon this state of Being. But if, as we suggest, we thus find phenomenally that knowing is a kind of Being which belongs to Being-in-the-world, one might object that with such an Interpretation of knowing, the problem of knowledge is nullified; for what is left to be asked if one presupposes that knowing is already ‘alongside’ its world, when it is not supposed to reach that world except in the transcending of the subject? In this question the constructivist ‘standpoint’, which has not been phenomenally demonstrated, again comes to the fore; but quite apart from this, what higher court is to decide whether and in what sense there is to be any problem of knowledge other than that of the phenomenon of knowing as such and the kind of Being which belongs to the knower? BTMR §13

If we now ask what shows itself in the phenomenal findings about knowing, we must keep in mind that knowing is grounded beforehand in a Being-already-alongside-the-world, which is essentially constitutive for Dasein’s Being. Proximally, this Being-already-alongside is not just a fixed staring at something that is purely present-at-hand. Being-in-the-world, as concern, is fascinated by the world with which it is concerned. If knowing is to be possible as a way of determining the nature of the present-at-hand by observing it, then there must first be a deficiency in our having-to-do with the world concernfully. When concern holds back (Sichenthalten) from any kind of producing, manipulating, and the like, it puts itself into what is now the sole remaining MODE of Being-in, the MODE of just tarrying alongside… . (das Nur-noch-verweilen bei …) This kind of Being towards the world is one which lets us encounter entities within-the-world purely in the way the look (eidos), just that; on the basis of this kind of Being, and as a MODE of it, looking explicitly at what we encounter is possible. Looking at something in this way is sometimes a definite way of taking up a direction towards something – of setting our sights towards what is present-at-hand. It takes over a ‘view-point’ in advance from the entity which it encounters. Such looking-at enters the MODE of dwelling autonomously alongside entities within-the-world. In this kind of ‘dwelling’ as a holding-oneself-back from any manipulation or utilization, the perception of the present-at-hand is consummated. Perception is consummated when one addresses oneself to something as something and discusses it as such. This amounts to interpretation in the broadest sense; and on the basis of such interpretation, perception becomes an act of making determinate. What is thus perceived and made determinate can be expressed in propositions, and can be retained and preserved as what has thus been asserted. This perceptive retention of an assertion about something is itself a way of Being-in-the-world; it is not to be Interpreted as a ‘procedure’ by which a subject provides itself with representations (Vorstellungen) of something which remain stored up ‘inside’ as having been thus appropriated, and with regard to which the question of how they ‘agree’ with actuality can occasionally arise. (SZ:62) BTMR §13

We have now pointed out how those MODES of Being-in-the-world which are constitutive for knowing the world are interconnected in their foundations; this makes it plain that in knowing, Dasein achieves a new status of Being (Seinsstand) towards a world which has already been discovered in Dasein itself. This new possibility of Being can develop itself autonomously; it can become a task to be accomplished, and as scientific knowledge it can take over the guidance for Being-in-the-world. But a ‘commercium’ of the subject with a world does not get created for the first time by knowing, nor does it arise from some way in which the world acts upon a subject. Knowing is a MODE of Dasein founded upon Being-in-the-world. Thus Being-in-the-world, as a basic state, must be Interpreted beforehand. BTMR §13

A glance at previous ontology shows that if one fails to see Being-in-the-world as a state of Dasein, the phenomenon of worldhood likewise gets passed over. One tries instead to Interpret the world in terms of the Being of those entities which are present-at-hand within-the-world but which are by no means proximally discovered – namely, in terms of Nature. If one understands Nature ontologico-categorially, one finds that Nature is a limiting case of the Being of possible entities within-the-world. Only in some definite MODE of its own Being-in-the-world can Dasein discover entities as Nature. This manner of knowing them has the character of depriving the world of its worldhood in a definite way. ‘Nature’, as the categorial aggregate of those structures of Being which a definite entity encountered within-the-world may possess, can never make worldhood intelligible. But even the phenomenon of ‘Nature’, as it is conceived, for instance, in romanticism, can be grasped ontologically only in terms of the concept of the world – that is to say, in terms of the analytic of Dasein. BTMR §14

The kind of Being which belongs to these entities is readiness-to-hand. But this characteristic is not to be understood as merely a way of taking them, as if we were talking such ‘aspects’ into the ‘entities’ which we proximally encounter, or as if some world-stuff which is proximally present-at-hand in itself were ‘given subjective colouring’ in this way. Such an Interpretation would overlook the fact that in this case these entities would have to be understood and discovered beforehand as something purely present-at-hand, and must have priority and take the lead in the sequence of those dealings with the ‘world’ in which something is discovered and made one’s own. But this already runs counter to the ontological meaning of cognition, which we have exhibited as a founded MODE of Being-in-the-world. To lay bare what is just present-at-hand and no more, cognition must first penetrate beyond what is ready-to-hand in our concern. Readiness-to-hand is the way in which entities as they are ‘in themselves’ are defined ontologico-categorially. Yet only by reason of something present-at-hand, ‘is there’ anything ready-to-hand. Does it follow, however, granting this thesis for the nonce, that readiness-to-hand is ontologically founded upon presence-at-hand? BTMR §15

In our concernful dealings, however, we not only come up against unusable things within what is ready-to-hand already: we also find things which are missing – which not only are not ‘handy’ (“handlich”) but are not ‘to hand’ (“zur Hand”) at all. Again, to miss something in this way amounts to coming across something un-ready-to-hand. When we notice what is un-ready-to-hand, that which is ready-to-hand enters the MODE of obtrusiveness The more urgently (Je dringlicher) we need what is missing, and the more authentically it is encountered in its un-readiness-to-hand, all the more obtrusive (um so aufdringlicher) does that which is ready-to-hand become – so much so, indeed, that it seems to lose its character of readiness-to-hand. It reveals itself as something just presentat-hand and no more, which cannot be budged without the thing that is missing. The helpless way in which we stand before it is a deficient MODE of concern, and as such it uncovers the Being-just-present-at-hand-andno-more of something ready-to-hand. BTMR §16

In establishing a sign, however, one does not necessarily have to produce equipment which is not yet ready-to-hand at all. Signs also arise when one takes as a sign (Zum-Zeichen-nehmen) something that is ready-to-hand already. In this MODE, signs “get established” in a sense which is even more primordial. In indicating, a ready-to-hand equipment totality, and even the environment in general, can be provided with an availability which is circumspectively oriented; and not only this: establishing a sign can, above all, reveal. What gets taken as a sign becomes accessible only through its readiness-to-hand. If, for instance, the south wind ‘is accepted’ (“gilt”) by the farmer as a sign of rain, then this ‘acceptance’ (“Geltung”) – or the ‘value’ with which the entity is ‘invested’ – is not a sort of bonus over and above what is already present-at-hand in itself – viz, the flow of air in a definite geographical direction. The south wind may be meteorologically accessible as something which just occurs; but it is never present-at-hand proximally in such a way as this, only occasionally taking over the function of a warning signal. On the contrary, only by the circumspection with which one takes account of things in farming, is the south wind discovered in its Being. (SZ:81) BTMR §17

Whenever we let there be an involvement with something in something beforehand, our doing so is grounded in our understanding such things as letting something be involved, and such things as the “with-which” and the “in-which” of involvements. Anything of this sort, and anything else that is basic for it, such as the “towards-this” as that in which there is an involvement, or such as the “for-the-sake-of-which” to which every “towards-which” ultimately goes back – all these must be disclosed beforehand with a certain intelligibility (Verständlichkeit). And what is that wherein Dasein as Being-in-the-world understands itself pre-ontologically? In understanding a context of relations such as we have mentioned, Dasein has assigned itself to an “in-order-to” (Um-zu), and it has done so in terms of a potentiality-for-Being for the sake of which it itself is – one which it may have seized upon either explicitly or tacitly, and which may be either authentic or inauthentic. This “in-order-to” prescribes a “towards-this” as a possible “in-which” for letting something be involved; and the structure of letting it be involved implies that this is an involvement which something has – an involvement which is with something. Dasein always assigns itself from a “for-the-sake-of-which” to the “with-which” of an involvement; that is to say, to the extent that it is, it always lets entities be encountered as ready-to-hand. That wherein (Worin) Dasein understands itself beforehand in the MODE of assigning itself is that for which (das Woraufhin) it has let entities be encountered beforehand. The “wherein” of an act of understanding which assigns or refers itself, is that for which one lets entities be encountered in the kind of Being that belongs to involvements; and this “wherein” is the phenomenon of the world. And the structure of that to which (woraufhin) Dasein assigns itself is what makes up the worldhood of the world. BTMR §18

Hardness gets taken as resistance. But neither hardness nor resistance is understood in a phenomenal sense, as something experienced in itself whose nature can be determined in such an experience. For Descartes, resistance amounts to no more than not yielding place – that is, not undergoing any change of location. So if a Thing resists, this means that it stays in a definite location relatively to some other Thing which is changing its location, or that it is changing its own location with a velocity which permits the other Thing to ‘catch up’ with it. But when the experience of hardness is Interpreted this way, the kind of Being which belongs to sensory perception is obliterated, and so is any possibility that the entities encountered in such perception should be grasped in their Being. Descartes takes the kind of Being which belongs to the perception of something, and translates it into the only kind he knows: the perception of something becomes a definite way of Being-present-at-hand-side-byside of two res extensae which are present-at-hand; the way in which their movements are related is itself a MODE of that extensio by which the presence-at-hand of the corporeal Thing is primarily characterized. Of course no behaviour in which one feels one’s way by touch (eines tastenden Verhaltens) can be ‘completed’ unless what can thus be felt (des Betastbaren) has ‘closeness’ of a very special kind. But this does not mean that touching ( Berührung) and the hardness which makes itself known in touching consist ontologically in different velocities of two corporeal Things. Hardness and resistance do not show themselves at all unless an entity has the kind of Being which Dasein – or at least something living – possesses. BTMR §21

But quite apart from the specific problem of the world itself, can the Being of what we encounter proximally within-the-world be reached ontologically by this procedure? When we speak of material Thinghood, have we not tacitly posited a kind of Being – the constant presence-at hand of Things – which is so far from having been rounded out ontologically by subsequently endowing entities with value-predicates, that these value-characters themselves are rather just ontical characteristics of those entities which have the kind of Being possessed by Things? Adding on value-predicates cannot tell us anything at all new about the Being of goods, but would merely presuppose again that goods have pure presence-at-hand as their kind of Being. Values would then be determinate characteristics which a Thing possesses, and they would be present-at-hand. They would have their sole ultimate ontological source in our previously laying down the actuality of Things as the fundamental stratum. But even prephenomenological experience shows that in an entity which is supposedly a Thing, there is something that will not become fully intelligible through Thinghood alone. Thus the Being of Things has to be rounded out. What, then does the Being of values or their ‘validity’ (“Geltung”) (which Lotze took as a MODE of ‘affirmation’) really amount to ontologically? And what does it signify ontologically for Things to be ‘invested’ with values in this way? As long as these matters remain obscure, to reconstruct the Thing of use in terms of the Thing of Nature is an ontologically questionable undertaking, even if one disregards the way in which the problematic has been perverted in principle. And if we are to reconstruct this Thing of use, which supposedly comes to us in the first instance ‘with its skin off’, does not this always require that we previously take a positive look at the phenomenon whose totality such a reconstruction is to restore? But if we have not given a proper explanation beforehand of its ownmost state of Being, are we not building our reconstruction without a plan? Inasmuch as this reconstruction and ‘rounding-out’ of the traditional ontology of the ‘world’ results in our reaching the same entities with which we started when we analysed the readiness-to-hand of equipment and the totality of (SZ:100) involvements, it seems as if the Being of these entities ‘has in fact been clarified or has at least become a problem. But by taking extensio as a proprietas, Descartes can hardly reach the Being of substance; and by taking refuge in ‘value’-characteristics (“wertlichen” Beschaffenheiten) we are just as far from even catching a glimpse of Being as readiness-to-hand, let alone permitting it to become an ontological theme.Descartes has narrowed down the question of the world to that of Things of Nature (Naturdinglichkeit) as those entities within-the-world’ which are proximally accessible. He has confirmed the opinion that to know an entity in what is supposedly the most rigorous ontical manner is our only possible access to the primary Being of the entity which such knowledge reveals. But at the same time we must have the insight to see that in principle the ‘roundings-out’ of the Thing-ontology also operate on the same dogmatic basis as that which Descartes has adopted.We have already intimated in Section 14 that passing over the world and those ‘entities which we proximally encounter is not accidental, not an oversight which it would be’ simple to correct, but that it is grounded in a kind of Being which belongs essentially to Dasein itself. When our analytic of Dasein has given some transparency to those main structures of Dasein which are of the most importance in the framework of this problematic, and when we have assigned (zugewiesen) to the concept of BeinBeing in general the horizon within which its intelligibility becomes possible, so that readiness-to-hand and presence-at-hand also become primordially intelligible ontologically for the first time, only then can our critique of the Cartesian ontology of the world (an ontology which, in principle, is still the usual one today) come philosophically into its own.To do this, we must show several things. (See Part One, Division Three.) BTMR §21

‘In the region of’ means not only ‘in the direction of’ but also within the range (Umkreis) of something that lies in that direction. The kind of place which is constituted by direction and remoteness (and closeness is only a MODE of the latter) is already oriented towards a region and oriented within it. Something like a region must first be discovered if there is to be any possibility of allotting or coming across places for a totality of equipment that is circumspectively at one’s disposal. The regional orientation of the multiplicity of places belonging to the ready-to-hand goes to make up the aroundness – the “round-about-us” (das Um-uns-herum) – of those entities which we encounter as closest environmentally. A three-dimensional multiplicity of possible positions which gets filled up with Things present-at-hand is never proximally given. This dimensionality of space is still veiled in the spatiality of the ready-to-hand. The ‘above’ is what is ‘on the ceiling’; the ‘below’ is what is ‘on the floor’; (SZ:103) the ‘behind’ is what is ‘at the door’; all “wheres” are discovered and circumspectively interpreted as we go our ways in everyday dealings; they are not ascertained and catalogued by the observational measurement of space. BTMR §22

(SZ:105) When we speak of deseverance as a kind of Being which Dasein has with regard to its Being-in-the-world, we do not understand by it any such thing as remoteness (or closeness) or even a distance. We use the expression “deseverance” in a signification which is both active and transitive. It stands for a constitutive state of Dasein’s ‘ Being – a state with regard to which removing something in the sense of putting it away is only a determinate factical MODE. “De-severing” amounts to making the farness vanish – that is, making the remoteness of something disappear, bringing it close. Dasein is essentially de-severant: it lets any entity be encountered close by as the entity which it is. De-severance discovers remoteness; and remoteness, like distance, is a determinate categorial characteristic of entities whose nature is not that of Dasein. De-severance, however, is an existentiale; this must be kept in mind. Only to the extent that entities are revealed for Dasein in their deseveredness (Entferntheit), do ‘remotenesses’ ‘ (“Entfernungen”) and distances with regard to other things become accessible in entities within-the-world themselves. Two points are just as little desevered from one another as two Things, for neither of these types of entity has the kind of Being which would make it capable of desevering. They merely have a measurable distance between them, which we can come across in our de-severing. BTMR §23

Our analysis of the worldhood of the world has constantly been bringing the whole phenomenon of Being-in-the-world into view, although its constitutive items have not all stood out with the same phenomenal distinctness as the phenomenon of the world itself. We have Interpreted the world ontologically by going through what is ready-to-hand within-the-world; and this Interpretation has been put first, because Dasein, in its everydayness (with regard to which Dasein remains a constant theme for study), not only is in a world but comports itself towards that world with one predominant kind of Being. Proximally and for the most part Dasein is fascinated with its world. Dasein is thus absorbed in the world; the kind of Being which it thus possesses, and in general the Being-in which underlies it, are essential in determining the character of a phenomenon which we are now about to study. We shall approach this phenomenon by asking who it is that Dasein is in its everydayness. All the structures of Being which belong to Dasein, together with the phenomenon which provides the answer to this question of the “who”, are ways of its Being. To characterize these ontologically is to do so existentially. We must therefore pose the question correctly and outline the procedure for bringing into view a broader phenomenal domain of Dasein’s everydayness. By directing our researches, towards the phenomenon which is to provide us with an answer to the question of the “who”, we shall be led to certain structures of Dasein which are equiprimordial with Being-in-the-world: Being-with and Daseinwith (Mitsein und Mitdasein). In this kind of Being is grounded the MODE of everyday Being-one’s-Self (Selbstsein); the explication of this MODE will (SZ:114) enable us to see what we may call the ‘subject’ of everydayness – the “they”. Our chapter on the ‘who’ of the average Dasein will thus be divided up as follows: 1. an approach to the existential question of the “who” of Dasein (Section 25); 2. the Dasein-with of Others, and everyday Being-with (Section 26); 3. everyday Being-one’s-Self and the “they” (Section 27). BTMR §24

The answer to the question of the “who” of everyday Dasein is to be obtained by analysing that kind of Being in which Dasein maintains itself proximally and for the most part. Our investigation takes its orientation from Being-in-the-world – that basic state of Dasein by which every MODE of its Being gets co-determined. If we are correct in saying that by the foregoing explication of the world, the remaining structural items of Being-in-the-world have become visible, then this must also have prepared us, in a way, for answering the question of the “who”. BTMR §26

Dasein understands itself proximally and for the most part in terms of its world; and the Dasein-with of Others’is often encountered in terms of what is ready-to-hand within-the-world. But even if Others become themes for study, as it were, in their own Dasien, they are not encountered as person-Things present-at-hand: we meet them ‘at work’, that is, primarily in their Being-in-the-world. Even if we see the Other ‘just standing around’, he is never apprehended as a human-Thing present-at-hand, but his ‘standing-around’ is an existential MODE of Being – an unconcerned, uncircumspective tarrying alongside everything and nothing (Verweilen bei Allem und Keinem). The Other is encountered in his Dasein-with in the world. BTMR §26

The expression ‘Dasein’, however, shows plainly that ‘in the first instance’ this entity is unrelated to Others, and that of course it can still be ‘with’ Others afterwards. Yet one must not fail to notice that we use the term “Dasein-with” to designate that Being for which the Others who are (die scienden Anderen) are freed within-the-world. This Dasein-with of the Others is disclosed within-the-world for a Dasein, and so too for those who are Daseins with us (die Mitdaseienden), only because Dasein in itself is essentially Being-with. The phenomenological assertion that “Dasein is essentially Being-with” has an existential-ontological meaning. It does not seek to establish ontically that factically I am not present-at-hand alone, and that Others of my kind occur. If this were what is meant by the proposition that Dasein’s Being-in-the-world is essentially constituted by Being-with, then Being-with would not be an existential attribute which Dasein, of its own accord, has coming to it from its own kind of Being. It would rather be something which turns up in every case by reason of the occurrence of Others. Being-with is an existential characteristic of Dasein even when factically no Other is present-at-hand or perceived. Even Dasein’s Being-alone is Being-with in the world. The Other can be missing only in and for a Being-with. Being-alone is a deficient MODE of Being-with; its very possibility is the proof of this. On the other hand, factical Being-alone is not obviated by the occurrence of a second example of a human being ‘beside’ me, or by ten such examples. Even if these and more are present-at-hand, Dasein can still be alone. So Being-with and the facticity of Being with one another are not based on the occurrence together of several ‘subjects’. Yet Being-alone ‘among’ many does not mean that with regard to their Being they are merely present-at-hand there alongside us. Even in our Being ‘among them’ they are there with us; their Dasein-with is encountered in a MODE in which they are indifferent and alien. Being missing and ‘Being away’ (Das Fehlen und “Fortsein”) are MODES of Dasein-with, and are possible only because Dasein as Being-with lets the Dasein of Others be encountered in its world. Being-with is in every case a characteristic of one’s own Dasein; Dasein-with characterizes the Dasein of Others to the extent that it is freed by its world for a Being-with. Only so far as one’s own Dasein has the essential structure of Being-with, is it Dasein-with as encounterable for Others. BTMR §26

Solicitude proves to be a state of Dasein’s Being – one which, in accordance with its different possibilities, is bound up with its Being towards the world of its concern, and likewise with its authentic Being towards itself. Being with one another is based proximally and often exclusively upon what is a matter of common concern in such Being. A Being-with-one-another which arises (entspringt) from one’s doing the same thing as someone else, not only keeps for the most part within the outer limits, but enters the MODE of distance and reserve. The Being-with-one-another of those who are hired for the same affair often thrives only on mistrust. On the other hand, when they devote themselves to the same affair in common, their doing so is determined by the manner in which their Dasein, each in its own way, has been taken hold of. They thus become authentically bound together, and this makes possible the right kind of objectivity (die rechte Sachlichkeit), which frees the Other in his freedom for himself. BTMR §26

In the preparatory stage of the existential analytic of Dasein, we have for our leading theme this entity’s basic state, Being-in-the-World. Our first aim is to bring into relief phenomenally the unitary primordial structure of Dasein’s Being, in terms of which its possibilities and the ways for it ‘to be’ are ontologically determined. Up till now, our phenomenal characterization of Being-in-the-world has been directed towards the world, as a structural item of Being-in-the-world, and has attempted to provide an answer to the question about the “who” of this entity in its everydayness. But even in first marking out the tasks of a preparatory fundamental analysis of Dasein, we have already provided an advance orientation as to Being-in as such, and have illustrated it in the concrete MODE of knowing the world. BTMR §28

In understanding and state-of-mind, we shall see the two constitutive ways of being the “there”; and these are equiprimordial. If these are to be analysed, some phenomenal confirmation is necessary; in both cases this will be attained by Interpreting some concrete MODE which is important for the subsequent problematic. State-of-mind and understanding are characterized equiprimordially by discourse. BTMR §28

Under A (the existential Constitutuon of the “there”) we shall accordingly treat: Being-there as state-of-mind (Section 29); fear as a MODE of state-of-mind (Section 30); Being-there as understanding (Section 31); understanding and interpretation (Section 32); assertion as a derivative MODE of interpretation (Section 33); Being-there, discourse, and language (Section 34). BTMR §28

Later (Cf. Section 40) we shall provide an Interpretation of anxiety as such a basic state-of-mind of Dasein, and as one which is significant from the existential-ontological standpoint; with this in view, we shall now illustrate the phenomenon of state-of-mind even more concretely in its determinate MODE of fear. BTMR §29

§30. Fear as a MODE of State-of-Mind BTMR §30

Whether privatively or positively, fearing about something, as being-afraid in the face of something, always discloses equiprimordially entities within-the-world and Being-in – the former as threatening and the latter as threatened. Fear is a MODE of state-of-mind. BTMR §30

State-of-mind is one of the existential structures in which the Being of the ‘there’ maintains itself. Equiprimordial with it in constituting this Being is understanding. A state-of-mind always has its understanding, even if it merely keeps it suppressed. Understanding always has its mood. If we Interpret understanding as a fundamental existentiale, this indicates that this phenomenon is conceived as a basic MODE of Dasein’s Being. On the other hand, ‘understanding’ in the sense of one possible kind of cognizing among others (as distinguished, for instance, from ‘explaining’), must, like explaining, be Interpreted as an existential derivative of that primary understanding which is one of the constituents of the Being of the “there” in general. (SZ:143) BTMR §31

As understanding, Dasein projects its Being upon possibilities. This Being-towards-possibilities which understands is itself a potentiality-for-Being, and it is so because of the way these possibilities, as disclosed, exert their counter-thrust (Rückschlag) upon Dasein. The projecting of the understanding has its own possibility – that of developing itself (sich auszubilden). This development of the understanding we call “interpretation”. In it the understanding appropriates understandingly that which is understood by it. In interpretation, understanding does not become something different. It becomes itself. Such interpretation is grounded existentially in understanding; the latter does not arise from the former. Nor is interpretation the acquiring of information about what is understood; it is rather the working-out of possibilities projected in understanding. In accordance with the trend of these preparatory analyses of everyday Dasein, we shall pursue the phenomenon of interpretation in understanding the world – that is, in inauthentic understanding, and indeed in the MODE of its genuineness. BTMR §32

The ready-to-hand is always understood in terms of a totality of involvements. This totality need not be grasped explicitly by a thematic interpretation. Even if it has undergone such an interpretation, it recedes into an understanding which does not stand out from the background. And this is the very MODE in which it is the essential foundation for everyday circumspective interpretation. In every case this interpretation is grounded in something we have in advance – in a fore-having. As the appropriation of understanding, the interpretation operates in Being towards a totality of involvements which is already understood – a Being which understands. When something is understood but is still veiled, it becomes unveiled by an act of appropriation, and this is always done under the guidance of a point of view, which fixes that with regard to which what is understood is to be interpreted. In every case interpretation is grounded in something we see in advance – in a fore-sight. This fore-sight ‘takes the first cut’ out of what has been taken into our fore-having, and it does so with a view to a definite way in which this can be interpreted. Anything understood which is held in our fore-having and towards which we set our sights ‘foresightedly’, becomes conceptualizable through the interpretation. In such an interpretation, the way in which the entity we are interpreting is to be conceived can be drawn from the entity itself, or the interpretation can force the entity into concepts to which it is opposed in its manner of Being. In either case, the interpretation has already decided for a definite way of conceiving it, either with finality or with reservations; it is grounded in something we grasp in advance – in a fore-conception. BTMR §32

§33. Assertion as a Derivative MODE of Interpretation BTMR §33

If we bring together the three significations of ‘assertion’ which we have analysed, and get a unitary view of the full phenomenon, then we may define “assertion” as “a pointing-out which gives something a definite character and which communicates”. It remains to ask with what justification we have taken assertion as a MODE of interpretation at all. If it is something of this sort, then the essential structures of interpretation must recur in it. The pointing-out which assertion does is performed on the basis of what has already been disclosed in understanding or discovered circumspectively. Assertion is not a free-floating kind of behaviour which, in its own right, might be capable of disclosing entities in general in a primary way: on the contrary it always maintains itself on the basis of Being-in-the-world. What we have shown earlier in relation to knowing the world, holds just as well as assertion. Any assertion requires a fore-having of whatever has been disclosed; and this is what it points out by way of giving something a definite character. Furthermore, in any approach when one gives something a definite character, one is already taking a look directionally at what is to be put forward in the assertion. When an entity which has been presented is given a definite character, the function of giving it such a character is taken over by that with regard to which we set our sights towards the entity. Thus any assertion requires a fore-sight; in this the predicate which we are to assign (zuzuweisende) and make stand out, gets loosened, so to speak, from its unexpressed inclusion in the entity itself. To any assertion as a communication which gives something a definite character there belongs, moreover, an Articulation of what is pointed out, and this Articulation is in accordance with significations. Such an assertion will operate with a definite way of conceiving: “The hammer is heavy”, “Heaviness belongs to the hammer”, “The hammer has the property of heaviness”. When an assertion is made, some foreconception is always implied; but it remains for the most part inconspicuous, because the language already hides in itself a developed way of conceiving. Like any interpretation whatever, assertion necessarily has a fore-having, a fore-sight, and a fore-conception as its existential foundations. (SZ:157) BTMR §33

But to what extent does it become a derivative MODE of interpretation? What has been modified in it? We can point out the modification if we stick to certain limiting cases of assertion which function in logic as normal cases and as examples of the ‘simplest’ assertion-phenomena. Prior to all analysis, logic has already understood ‘logically’ what it takes as a theme under the heading of the “categorical statement” – for instance, ‘The hammer is heavy’. The unexplained presupposition is that the ‘meaning’ of this sentence is to be taken as: “This Thing – a hammer – has the property of heaviness”. In concernful circumspection there are no such assertions ‘at first’. But such circumspection has of course its specific ways of interpreting, and these, as compared with the ‘theoretical judgment’ just mentioned, may take some such form as ‘The hammer is too heavy’, or rather just ‘Too heavy!’, ‘Hand me the other hammer!’ Interpretation is carried out primordially not in a theoretical statement but in an action of circumspective concern – laying aside the unsuitable tool, or exchanging it, ‘without wasting words’. From the fact that words are absent, it may not be concluded that interpretation is absent. On the other hand, the kind of interpretation which is circumspectively expressed is not necessarily already an assertion in the sense we have defined. By what existential-ontological modifications does assertion arise from circums interpretation? BTMR §33

Keeping silent is another essential possibility of discourse, and it has the same existential foundation. In talking with one another, the person who keeps silent can ‘make one understand’ (that is, he can develop an understanding), and he can do so more authentically than the person who is never short of words. Speaking at length (Viel-sprechen) about something does not offer the slightest guarantee that thereby understanding is advanced. On the contrary, talking extensively about something, covers it up and brings what is understood to a sham clarity – the unintelligibility of the trivial. But to keep silent does not mean to be dumb. On the contrary, if a man is dumb, he still has a tendency to ‘speak’. Such a person has not proved that he can keep silence; indeed, he entirely lacks the possibility of proving anything of the sort. And the person who is accustomed by Nature to speak little is no better able to show that he is keeping silent or that he is the sort of person who can do so. He who never says anything cannot keep silent at any given moment. Keeping silent authentically is possible only in genuine discoursing. To be able to keep silent, Dasein must have something to say – that is, it must have at its disposal an authentic and rich disclosedness of itself. In that case one’s reticence (Verschwiegenheit) makes something manifest, and does away with ‘idle talk’ (“Gerede”). As a MODE of discoursing, reticence Articulates the intelligibility of Dasein in so primordial a manner that it gives rise to a potentiality-for-hearing which is genuine, and to a Being-with-one-another which is transparent. (SZ:165) BTMR §34

Rather it concerns itself with a kind of knowing, but just in order to have known. Both this not tarrying in the environment with which one concerns oneself, and this distraction by new possibilities, are constitutive items for curiosity; and upon these is founded the third essential characteristic of this phenomenon, which we call the character of “never dwelling anywhere” (Aufenthaltslosigkeit). Curiosity is everywhere and nowhere. This MODE of Being-in-the-world reveals a new kind of Being of everyday Dasein – a kind in which Dasein is constantly uprooting itself. (SZ:173) BTMR §36

This term does not express any negative evaluation, but is used to signify that Dasein is proximally and for the most part alongside the ‘world’ of its concern. This “absorption in …” (Aufgehen bei …) has mostly the character of Being-lost in the publicness of the “they”. Dasein has, in the first instance, fallen away (abgefallen) from itself as an authentic potentiality for Being its Self, and has fallen into the ‘world’. “Fallenness” into the ‘world’ means an absorption in Being-with-one-another, in so far as the latter is guided by idle talk, curiosity, and ambiguity. Through the Interpretation of falling, what we have called the “inauthenticity” of Dasein may now be defined more precisely. On no account, however, do the terms “inauthentic” and “non-authentic” signify ‘really not’, as if in this MODE of Being, Dasein were altogether to lose its Being. “Inauthenticity,” does not mean anything like Being-no-longer-in-the-world, but amounts rather to a quite distinctive kind of Being-in-the-world – the kind which is completely, fascinated by the ‘world’ and by the Daseinwith of Others in the “they”. Not-Being-its-self (Das Nicht-es-selbst-sein) functions as a positive possibility of that entity which, in its essential concern, is absorbed in a world. This kind of not-Being has to be conceived as that kind of Being which is closest to Dasein and in which Dasein maintains itself for the most part. (SZ:176) BTMR §38

Neither in our first allusion to Being-in-the-world as Dasein’s basic state, nor in our characterization of its constitutive structural items, did we go beyond an analysis of the constitution of this kind of Being and take note of its character as a phenomenon. We have indeed described concern and solicitude, as the possible basic kinds of Being-in. But we did not discuss the question of the everyday kind of Being of these ways in which one may be. We also showed that Being-in is something quite different from a mere confrontation, whether by way of observation or by way of action; that is, it is not the Being-present-at-hand-together of a subject and an Object. Nevertheless, it must still have seemed that Being-in-the-world has the function of a rigid framework, within which Dasein’s possible ways of comporting itself towards its world run their course without touching the ‘framework’ itself as regards its Being. But this supposed ‘framework’ itself helps make up the kind of Being which is Dasein’s. An existential MODE of Being-in-the-world is documented in the phenomenon of falling. BTMR §38

Idle talk discloses to Dasein a Being towards its world, towards Others, and towards itself – a Being in which these are understood, but in a MODE of groundless floating. Curiosity discloses everything and anything, yet in such a way that Being-in is everywhere and nowhere. Ambiguity hides nothing from Dasein’s understanding, but only in order that Being-in-the-world should be suppressed in this uprooted “everywhere and nowhere”. (SZ:177) BTMR §38

But now that falling has been exhibited, have we not set forth a phenomenon which speaks directly against the definition we have used in indicating the formal idea of existence? Can Dasein be conceived as an entity for which, in its Being, its potentiality-for-Being is an issue, if this entity, in its very everydayness, has lost itself, and, in falling, ‘lives’ away from itself? But falling into the world would be phenomenal ‘evidence’ against the existentiality of Dasein only if Dasein were regarded as an isolated “I” or subject, as a self-point from which it moves away. In that case, the world would be an Object. Falling into the world would then have to be re-Interpreted ontologically as Being-present-at-hand in the manner of an entity within-the-world. If, however, we keep in mind that Dasein’s Being is in the state of Being-in-the-world, as we have already pointed out, then it becomes manifest that falling, as a kind of Being of this Being-in, affords us rather the most elemental evidence for Dasein’s existentiality. In failing, nothing other than our potentiality-for-Being-in world is the issue, even if in the MODE of inauthenticity. Dasein can fall only because Being-in-the-world understandingly with a state-of-mind is an issue for it. On the other hand, authentic existence is not something which floats above falling everydayness; existentially, it is only a modified way in which such everydayness is seized upon. BTMR §38

Being-anxious discloses, primordially and directly, the world as world. It is not the case, say, that the world first gets thought of by deliberating about it, just by itself, without regard for the entities within-the-world, and that, in the face of this world, anxiety then arises; what is rather the case is that the world as world is disclosed first and foremost by anxiety, as a MODE of state-of-mind. This does not signify, however, that in anxiety the worldhood of the world gets conceptualized. BTMR §40

Again everyday discourse and the everyday interpretation of Dasein furnish our most unbiased evidence that anxiety as a basic state-of-mind is disclosive in the manner we have shown. As we have said earlier, a state-of-mind makes manifest ‘how one is’. In anxiety one feels ‘uncanny’. Here the peculiar indefiniteness of that which Dasein finds itself alongside in anxiety, comes proximally to expression: the “nothing and nowhere”. But here “uncanniness” also means “not-being-at-home” (das Nichtzuhause-sein). In our first indication of the phenomenal character of Dasein’s basic state and in our clarification of the existential meaning of “Being-in” as distinguished from the categorial signification of ‘insideness’, Being-in was defined as “residing alongside …”, “Being-familiar with …” This character of Being-in was then brought to view more concretely through the everyday publicness of the “they”, which brings tranquillized self-assurance – ‘Being-at-home’, with all its obviousness – into the average everydayness of Dasein. On the other hand, as Dasein falls, anxiety brings it back from its absorption in the ‘world’. Everyday familiarity collapses. Dasein has been individualized, but individualized as Being-in-the-world. Being-in enters into the existential ‘MODE’ of the “not-at-home”. Nothing else is meant by our talk about ‘uncanniness’. (SZ:189) BTMR §40

If we Interpret Dasein’s uncanniness from an existential-ontological point of view as a threat which reaches Dasein itself and which comes from Dasein itself, we are not contending that in factical anxiety too it has always been understood in this sense. When Dasein “understands” uncanniness in the everyday manner, it does so by turning away from it in falling; in this turning-away, the “not-at-home” gets ‘dimmed down’. Yet the everydayness of this fleeing shows phenomenally that anxiety, as a basic state-of-mind, belongs to Dasein’s essential state of Being-in-the-world, which, as one that is existential, is never present-at-hand but is itself always in a MODE of factical Being-there – that is, in the MODE of a state-of-mind. That kind of Being-in-the-world which is tranquillized and familiar is a MODE of Dasein’s uncanniness, not the reverse. From an existential-ontological point of view, the “not-at-home” must be conceived as the more primordial phenomenon. BTMR §40

All the same, this tranquillized ‘willing’ under the guidance of the “they”, does not signify that one’s Being towards one’s potentiality-for-Being has been extinguished, but only that it has been modified. In such a case, one’s Being towards possibilities shows itself for the most part as mere wishing. In the wish Dasein projects its Being upon possibilities which not only have not been taken hold of in concern, but whose fulfilment has not even been pondered over and expected. On the contrary, in the MODE of mere wishing, the ascendancy of Being-ahead-of-oneself brings with it a lack of understanding for the factical possibilities. When the world has been primarily projected as a wish-world, Being-in-the-world has lost itself inertly in what is at its disposal; but it has done so in such a way that, in the light of what is wished for, that which is at its disposal (and this is all that is ready-to-hand) is never enough. Wishing is an existential modification of projecting oneself understandingly, when such selfprojection has’ fallen forfeit to thrownness and just keeps hankering after possibilities. Such hankering closes off the possibilities; what is ‘there’ in wishful hankering turns into the ‘actual world’. Ontologically, wishing presupposes care. BTMR §41

These investigations, which take precedence over any possible ontological question about Reality, have been carried out in the foregoing existential analytic. According to this analytic, knowing is a founded MODE of access to the Real. The Real is essentially accessible only as entities within-the-world. All access to such entities is founded ontologically upon the basic state of Dasein, Being-in-the-world; and this in turn has care as its even more primordial state of Being (ahead of itself – Being already in a world – as Being alongside entities within-the-world). BTMR §43

To have faith in the Reality of the ‘external world’, whether rightly or wrongly; to “prove” this Reality for it, whether adequately or inadequately; to presuppose it, whether explicitly or not – attempts such as these which have not mastered their own basis with full transparency, presuppose a subject which is proximally worldless or unsure of its world, and which must, at bottom, first assure itself of a world. Thus from the very beginning, Being-in-a-world is disposed to “take things” in some way (Auffassen), to suppose, to be certain, to have faith – a way of behaving which itself is always a founded MODE of Being-in-the-world. BTMR §43

If the term “Reality” is meant to stand for the Being of entities presentat-hand within-the-world (res) (and nothing else is understood thereby), then when it comes to analysing this MODE of Being, this signifies that entities within-the-world are ontologically conceivable only if the phenomenon of within-the-world-ness has been clarified. But within-the-worldness is based upon the phenomenon of the world, which, for its part, as an essential item in the structure of Being-in-the-world, belongs to the basic constitution of Dasein. Being-in-the-world, in turn, is bound up ontologically in the structural totality of Dasein’s Being, and we have characterized care as such a totality. But in this way we have marked out the foundations and the horizons which must be clarified if an analysis of Reality is to be possible. Only in this connection, moreover, does the character of the “in-itself” become ontologically intelligible. By taking our orientation from this context of problems, we have in our earlier analyses Interpreted the Being of entities within-the-world. BTMR §43

3. To Dasein’s state of Being belongs projection – disclosive Being towards its potentiality-for-Being. As something that understands, Dasein can understand itself in terms of the ‘world’ and Others or in terms of its ownmost potentiality-for-Being. The possibility just mentioned means that Dasein discloses itself to itself in and as its ownmost potentiality-for Being. This authentic disclosedncss shows the phenomenon of the most primordial truth in the MODE of authenticity. The most primordial, and indeed the most authentic, disclosedness in which Dasein, as a potentiality-for-Being, can be, is the truth of existence. This becomes existentially and ontologically definite only in connection with the analysis of Dasein’s authenticity. BTMR §44

4. To Dasein’s state of Being belongs falling. Proximally and for the most part Dasein is lost in its ‘world’. Its understanding, as a projection upon possibilities of Being, has diverted itself thither. Its absorption in the “they” signifies that it is dominated by the way things are publicly interpreted. That which has been uncovered and disclosed stands in a MODE in which it has been disguised and closed off by idle talk, curiosity, and ambiguity. Being towards entities has not been extinguished, but it has been uprooted. Entities have not been completely hidden; they are precisely the sort of thing that has been uncovered, but at the same time they have been disguised. They show themselves, but in the MODE of semblance. Likewise what has formerly been uncovered sinks back again, hidden and disguised. Because Dasein is essentially falling, its state of Being is such that it is in ‘untruth’. This term, like the expression ‘falling’, is here used ontologically. If we are to use it in existential analysis, we must (SZ:222) avoid giving it any ontically negative ‘evaluation’. To be closed off and covered up belongs to Dasein’s facticity. In its full existential-ontological meaning, the proposition that ‘Dasein is in the truth’ states equiprimordially that ‘Dasein is in untruth’. But only in so far as Dasein has been disclosed has it also been closed off; and only in so far as entities within-the-world have been uncovered along with Dasein, have such entities, as possibly encounterable within-the-world, been covered up (hidden) or disguised. BTMR §44

It is therefore essential that Dasein should explicitly appropriate what has already been uncovered, defend it against semblance and disguise, and assure itself of its uncoveredness again and again. The uncovering of anything new is never done on the basis of having something completely hidden, but takes its departure rather from uncoveredness in the MODE of semblance. Entities look as if … That is, they have, in a certain way, been uncovered already, and yet they are still disguised. BTMR §44

Not only is it wrong to invoke Aristotle for the thesis that the genuine ‘locus’ of truth lies in the judgment; even in its content this thesis fails to recognize the structure of truth. Assertion is not the primary ‘locus’ of truth. On the contrary, whether as a MODE in which uncoveredness is appropriated or as a way of Being-in-the-world, assertion is grounded in Dasein’s uncovering, or rather in its disclosedness. The most primordial ‘truth’ is the ‘locus’ of assertion; it is the ontological condition for the possibility that assertions can be either true or false – that they may uncover or cover things up. BTMR §44

What is the status of the fore-sight by which our ontological procedure has hitherto been guided? We have defined the idea of existence as a potentiality-for-Being – a potentiality which understands, and for which its own Being is an issue. But this potentiality-for-Being, as one which is in each case mine, is free either for authenticity or for inauthenticity or for a MODE in which neither of these has been differentiated. In starting with average everydayness, our Interpretation has heretofore been confined to the analysis of such existing as is either undifferentiated or inauthentic. Of course, even along this path, it was possible and indeed necessary to reach a concrete determination of the existentiality of existence. Nevertheless, our ontological characterization of the constitution of existence still lacked something essential. “Existence” means a potentiality-for-Being – but also one which is authentic. As lofig as the existential structure of an authentic potentiality-for-Being has not been brought into the idea of existence, the fore-sight by which an existential Interpretation is guided will lack primordiality. (SZ:233) BTMR §45

By pointing out that Dasein has an authentic potentiality-for-Being-a-whole, the existential analytic acquires assurance as to the constitution of Dasein’s primordial Being. But at the same time the authentic potentiality-for-Being-a-whole becomes visible as a MODE of care. And therewith the phenomenally adequate ground for a primordial Interpretation of the meaning of Dasein’s Being has also been assured. BTMR §45

But the primordial ontological basis for, Dasein’s existentiality is temporality. In terms of temporality, the articulated structural totality of Dasein’s Being as care first becomes existentially intelligible. The Interpretation of the meaning of Dasein’s Being cannot stop with this demonstration. The existential-temporal analysis of this entity needs to be confirmed concretely. We must go back and lay bare in their temporal meaning the ontological structures of Dasein which we have previously obtained. Everydayness reveals itself as a MODE of temporality. But by thus recapitulating our preparatory fundamental analysis of Dasein, we will at the same time make the phenomenon of temporality itself more transparent. In terms of temporality, it then becomes intelligible why Dasein is, and can be, historical in the basis of its Being, and why, as historical, it can develop historiology. (SZ:235) BTMR §45

The ‘deceased’ (Der “Verstorbene”) as distinct from the dead person (dem Gestorbenen), has been torn away from those who have ‘remained behind’ (den “Hinterbliebenen”), and is an object of ‘concern’ in the ways of funeral rites, interment, and the cult of ‘graves. And that is so because the deceased, in his kind of Being, is ‘still more’ than just an item of equipment, environmentally ready-to-hand, about which one can be concerned. In tarrying alongside him in their mourning and commemoration, those who have remained behind are with him, in a MODE of respectful solicitude. Thus the relationship-of-Being which one has towards the dead is not to be taken as a concernful Being-alongside something ready-to-hand. BTMR §47

We may formulate in three theses the discussion of death up to this point: 1. there belongs to Dasein, as long as it is, a “not-yet” which it will be – that which is constantly still outstanding; 2. the coming-to-its-end of what-is-not-yet-at-an-end (in which what is still outstanding is liquidated as regards its Being) has the character of no-longer-Dasein; 3. coming-to-an-end implies a MODE of Being in which the particular Dasein simply cannot be represented by someone else. BTMR §48

But this lack-of-togetherness which belongs to such a MODE of togetherness – this being-missing as still-outstanding – cannot by any means define ontologically that “not-yet” which belongs to Dasein as its possible death. Dasein does not have at all the kind of Being of something ready-to-handwithin-the-world. The togetherness of an entity of the kind which Dasein is ‘in running its course’ until that ‘course’ has been completed, is not constituted by a ‘continuing’ piecing-on of entities which, somehow and somewhere, are ready-to-hand already in their own right. BTMR §48

But ending as “getting finished” does not include fulfilling. On the other hand, whatever has got to be fulfilled must indeed reach the finishedness that is possible for it. Fulfilling is a MODE of ‘finishedness’, and is founded upon it. Finishedness is itself possible only as a determinate form of something present-at-hand or ready-to-hand. BTMR §48

But temptation, tranquillization, and alienation are distinguishing marks of the kind of Being called “falling”. As falling, everyday Being-towards-death is a constant fleeing in the face of death. Being-towards-the-end has the MODE of evasion in the face of it – giving new explanations for it, understanding it inauthentically, and concealing it. Factically one’s own Dasein is always dying already; that is to say, it is in a Being-towards-its-end. And it hides this Fact from itself by recoining “death” as just a “case of death” in Others – an everyday occurrence which, if need be, gives us the assurance still more plainly that ‘oneself’ is still ‘living’. But in thus falling and fleeing in the face of death, Dasein’s everydayness attests that the very “they” itself already has the definite character of Being-towards-death, even when it is not explicitly engaged in ‘thinking about death’. Even in average everydayness, this ownmost potentiality-for-Being, which is non-relational and not to be outstripped, is constantly an issue for Dasein. This is the case when its concern is merely in the MODE of an untroubled indifferencetowards the uttermost possibility of existence. BTMR §51

In our preliminary existential sketch, Being-towards-the-end has been defined as Being towards one’s ownmost potentiality-for-Being, which is non-relational and is not to be outstripped. Being towards this possibility, as a Being which exists, is brought face to face with the absolute impossibility of existence. Beyond this seemingly empty characterization of Being-towards-death, there has been revealed the concretion of this Being in the MODE of everydayness. In accordance with the tendency to falling, which is essential to everydayness, Being-towards-death has turned out to be an evasion in the face of death – an evasion which conceals. While our investigation has hitherto passed from a formal sketch of the ontological structure of death to the concrete analysis of everyday Being-towards-the-end, the direction is now to be reversed, and we shall arrive at the full existential conception of death by rounding out our Interpretation of everyday Being-towards-the-end. BTMR §52

One MODE of certainty is conviction. In conviction, Dasein lets the testimony of the thing itself which has been uncovered (the true thing itself) be the sole determinant for its Being towards that thing understandingly. Holding something for true is adequate as a way of maintaining oneself in the truth, if it is grounded in the uncovered entity itself, and if, as Being towards the entity so uncovered, it has become transparent to itself as regards its appropriateness to that entity. In any arbitrary fiction or in merely having some ‘view’ (“Ansicht”) about an entity, this sort of thing is lacking. BTMR §52

Conscience gives us ‘something’ to understand; it discloses. By characterizing this phenomenon formally in this way, we find ourselves enjoined to take it back into the disclosedness of Dasein. This disclosedness, as a basic state of that entity which we ourselves are, is constituted by state-of-mind, understanding, falling, and discourse. If we analyse conscience more penetratingly, it is revealed as a call (Ruf). Calling is a MODE of discourse. The call of conscience has the character of an appeal to Dasein by calling it to its ownmost potentiality-for-Being-its-Self; and this is done by way of summoning it to its ownmost Being-guilty. This existential Interpretation is necessarily a far cry from everyday ontical common sense, though it sets forth the ontological foundations of what the ordinary way of interpreting conscience has always understood within certain limits and has conceptualized as a ‘theory’ of conscience. Accordingly our existential Interpretation needs to be confirmed by a critique of the way in which conscience is ordinarily interpreted. When this phenomenon has been exhibited, we can bring out the extent to which it attests an authentic potentiality-for-Being of Dasein. To the call of conscience there corresponds a possible bearing. Our understanding of the appeal unveils itself as our wanting to have a conscience (Gewissenhabenwollen). But in this phenomenon lies that existentiell choosing which we seek – the choosing to choose a kind of Being-one’s-Self which, in accordance with its existential structure, we call “resoluteness”. Thus we can see how the analyses of this chapter are divided up: the (SZ:270) existential-ontological foundations of conscience (Section 55); the character of conscience as a call (Section 56); conscience as the call of care (Section 57); understanding the appeal, and guilt (Section 58); the existential Interpretation of conscience and the way conscience is ordinarily interpreted (Section 59); the existential structure of the authentic potentiality-for-Being which is attested in the conscience (Section 60). BTMR §54

We take calling as a MODE of discourse. Discourse articulates intelligibility. Characterizing conscience as a call is not just giving a ‘picture’, like the Kantian representation of the conscience as a court of justice. Vocal utterance, however, is not essential for discourse, and therefore not for the call either; this must not be overlooked. Discourse is already presupposed in any expressing or ‘proclaiming’ (“Ausrufen”). If the everyday interpretation knows a ‘voice’ of conscience, then one is not so much thinking of an utterance (for this is something which factically one never comes across); the ‘voice’ is taken rather as a giving-tounderstand. In the tendency to disclosure which belongs to the call, lies the momentum of a push – of an abrupt arousal. The call is from afar unto afar. It reaches him who wants to be brought back. BTMR §55

The call dispenses with any kind of utterance. It does not put itself into words at all; yet it remains nothing less than obscure and indefinite. Conscience discourses solely and constantly in the MODE of keeping silent. In this way it not only loses none of its perceptibility, but forces the Dasein which has been appealed to and summoned, into the reticence of itself. The fact that what is called in the call has not been formulated in words, does not give this phenomenon the indefiniteness of a mysterious voice, but merely indicates that our understanding of what is ‘called’ is not to be tied up with an expectation of anything like a communication. (SZ:274) BTMR §56

The call does not report events; it calls without uttering anything. The call discourses in the uncanny MODE of keeping silent. And it does this only because, in calling the one to whom the appeal is made, it does not call him into the public idle talk of the “they”, but calls him back from this into the reticence of his existent potentiality-for-Being. When the caller reaches him to whom the appeal is made, it does so with a cold assurance which is uncanny but by no means obvious. Wherein lies the basis for this assurance if not in the fact that when Dasein has been individualized down to itself in its uncanniness, it is for itself something that simply cannot be mistaken for anything else? What is it that so radically deprives Dasein of the possibility of misunderstanding itself by any sort of alibi and failing to recognize itself, if not the forsakenness (Verlassenheit) with which it has been abandoned (Überlassenheit) to itself? BTMR §57

The existential Interpretation of conscience is to exhibit an attestation of Dasein’s owninost potentiality-for-Being – an attestation which is (seiende) in Dasein itself. Conscience attests not by making something known in an undifferentiated manner, but by calling forth and summoning us to Being-guilty. That which is so attested becomes ‘grasped’ in the hearing which understands the call undisguisedly in the sense it has itself intended. The understanding of the appeal is a MODE of Dasein’s Being, and only as such does it give us the phenomenal content of what the call of conscience attests. The authentic understanding of the call has been characterized as “wanting to have a conscience”. This is a way of letting one’s ownmost Self take action in itself of its own accord in its Being-guilty, and represents phenomenally that authentic potentiality-for-Being which Dasein itself attests. The existential structure of this must now be laid bare. Only so can we proceed to the basic constitution of the authenticity of Dasein’s existence as disclosed in Dasein itself. BTMR §60

The third essential item in disclosedness is discourse. The call itself is a primordial kind of discourse for Dasein; but there is no corresponding counter-discourse in which, let us say, one talks about what the conscience has said, and pleads one’s cause. In hearing the call understandingly, one denies oneself any counter-discourse, not because one has been assailed by some ‘obscure power’, which suppresses one’s hearing, but because this hearing has appropriated the content of the call unconcealedly. In the call one’s constant Being-guilty is represented, and in this way the Self is brought back from the loud idle talk which goes with the common sense of the “they”. Thus the MODE of Articulative discourse which belongs to wanting to have a conscience, is one of reticence. Keeping silent has been characterized as an essential possibility of discourse. Anyone who keeps silent when he wants to give us to understand something, must ‘have something to say’. In the appeal Dasein gives itself to understand its ownmost potentiality-for-Being. This calling is therefore a keeping-silent. The discourse of the conscience never comes to utterance. BTMR §60

Resoluteness is a distinctive MODE of Dasein’s disclosedness. In an earlier passage, however, we have Interpreted disclosedness existentially as the primordial truth, Such truth is primarily not a quality of ‘judgment’ nor of any definite way of behaving, but something essentially constitutive for Being-in-the-world as such. Truth must be conceived as a fundamental existentiale. In our ontological clarification of the proposition that ‘Dasein is in the truth’ we have called attention to the primordial disclosedness of this entity as the truth of existence; and for the delimitation of its character we have referred to the analysis of Dasein’s authenticity. BTMR §60

In this way, the phenomenon of care will be adequately clarified for. the first time, and we shall then interrogate it as to its ontological meaning. When this meaning has been determined, temporality will have been laid bare. In exhibiting this, we are not led into out-of-the-way and sequestered domains of Dasein; we merely get a conception of the entire phenomenal content of Dasein’s basic existential constitution in the ultimate foundations of its own ontological intelligibility. Temporality gets experienced in a phenomenally primordial way in Dasein’s authentic Being-a-whole, in the phenomenon of anticipatory resoluteness. If temporality makes itself known primordially in this, then we may suppose that the temporality of anticipatory resoluteness is a distinctive MODE of temporality. Temporality has different possibilities and different ways of temporalizing itself. The basic possibilities (SZ:304) of existence, the authenticity and inauthenticity of Dasein, are grounded ontologically on possible temporalizations of temporality. BTMR §61

But on the other hand, in our Interpretation of the ‘connection’ between resoluteness and anticipation, we have first reached a full existential understanding of anticipation itself. Hitherto this could amount to no more than an ontological projection. We have now shown that anticipation is not just a fictitious possibility which we have forced upon Dasein; it is a MODE of an existentiell potentiality-for-Being that is attested in Dasein – a MODE which Dasein exacts of itself, if indeed it authentically understands itself as resolute. Anticipation ‘is’ not some kind of freefloating behaviour, but must be conceived as the possibility of the authenticity of that resoluteness which has been attested in an existentiell way – a possibility hidden in such resoluteness, and thus attested therewith. Authentic ‘thinking about death’ is a wanting-to-have-a-conscience, which has become transparent to itself in an existcntiell manner. If resoluteness, as authentic, tends towards the MODE delimited by anticipation, and if anticipation goes to make up Dasein’s authentic potentiality-for-Being-a-whole, then in the resoluteness which is attested in an existentiell manner, there is attested with it an authentic potentiality-for-Being-a-whole which belongs to Dasein. The question of the polentiality-for-Being-a-whole is one which is factical and existentiell. It is answered by Dasein as resolute. The question of Dasein’s potentiality-for-Being-a-whole has now fully sloughed off the character indicated at the beginning, when we treated it as it if were just a theoretical or methodological question of the analytic of Dasein, arising from the endeavour to have the whole of Dasein completely ‘given’. The question of Dasein’s totality, which at the beginning we discussed only with regard to ontological method, has its justification, but only because the ground for that justification goes back to an ontical possibility of Dasein. BTMR §62

In characterizing the ‘connection’ between care and Selfhood, our aim was not only to clarify the special problem of “I”-hood, but also to help in the final preparation for getting into our grasp phenomenally the totality of Dasein’s structural whole. We need the unwavering discipline of the existential way of putting the question, if, for our ontological point of view, Dasein’s kind of Being is not to be finally perverted into a MODE of presence-at-hand, even one which is wholly undifferentiated. Dasein becomes ‘essentially’ Dasein in that authentic existence which constitutes itself as anticipatory resoluteness. Such resoluteness, as a MODE of the authenticity of care, contains Dasein’s primordial Self-constancy and totality. We must take an undistracted look at these and understand them existentially if we are to lay bare the ontological meaning of Dasein’s Being. BTMR §65

If resoluteness makes up the MODE of authentic care, and if this itself is possible only through temporality, then the phenomenon at which we have arrived by taking a look at resoluteness, must present us with only a modality of temporality, by which, after all, care as such is made possible. Dasein’s totality of Being as care means: ahead-of-itself-alreadybeing-in (a world) as Being-alongside (entities encountered within-the-world). When we first fixed upon this articulated structure, we suggested that with regard to this articulation the ontological question must be pursued still further back until the unity of the totality of this structural manifoldness has been laid bare. The primordial unity of the structure of care lies in temporality. BTMR §65

On the other hand, we lack such an indication for the third item which is constitutive for care – the Being-alongside which falls. This should not signify that falling is not also grounded in temporality; it should instead give us a hint that making-present, as the primary basis for falling into the ready-to-hand and present-at-hand with which’ we concern ourselves, remains included in the future and in having been, and is included in these in the MODE of primordial temporality. When resolute, Dasein has brought itself back from falling, and has done so precisely in order to be more authentically ‘there’ in the moment of vision’ as regards the Situation which has been disclosed. BTMR §65

Our next task is to go beyond the temporal analysis of Dasein’s authentic potentiality-for-Being-a-whole and a general characterization of the temporality of care so that Dasein’s’ inauthenticity may be made visible in its own specific temporality. Temporality first showed itself in anticipatory resoluteness. This is the authentic MODE of disclosedness, though disclosedness maintains itself for the most part in the inauthenticity with which the “they” fallingly interprets itself. In characterizing the temporality of disclosedness in general, we are led to the temporal understanding of that concernful Being-in-the-world which lies closest to us, and therefore of the average undifferentiatedness of Dasein from which the existential analytic first took its start. We have called Dasein’s average kind of Being, in which it maintains itself proximally and for the most part, “everydayness”. By repeating the earlier analysis, we must reveal everydayness in its temporal meaning, so that the problematic included in temporality may come to light, and the seemingly ‘obvious’ character of the preparatory analyses may completely disappear. Indeed, confirmation is to be found for temporality in all the essential structures of Dasein’s basic constitution. Yet this will not lead to running through our analyses again superficially and schematically in the same sequence of presentation. The course of our temporal analysis is directed otherwise: it is to make (SZ:332) plainer the interconnection of our earlier considerations and to do away with whatever is accidental and seemingly arbitrary. Beyond these necessities of method, however, the phenomenon itself gives us motives which compel us to articulate our analysis in a different way when we repeat it. BTMR §66

If the term “understanding” is taken in a way which is primordially existential, it means to be projecting towards a potentiality-for-Being for the sake of which any Dasein exists. In understanding, one’s own potentialityfor-Being is disclosed in such a way that one’s Dasein always knows understandingly what it is capable of. It ‘knows’ this, however, not by having discovered some fact, but by maintaining itself in an existentiell possibility. The kind of ignorance which corresponds to this, does not consist in an absence or cessation of understanding, but must be regarded as a deficient MODE of the projectedness of one’s potentiality-for-Being. Existence can be questionable. If it is to be possible for something ‘to be in question’ (das “In-Frage-stehen”), a disclosedness is needed. When one understands oneself projectively in an existentiell possibility, the future underlies this understanding, and it does so as a coming-towards-oneself out of that current possibility as which one’s Dasein exists. The future makes ontologically possible an entity which is in such a way that it exists understandingly in its potentiality-for-Being. Projection is basically futural; it does not primarily grasp the projected possibility thematically just by having it in view, but it throws itself into it as a possibility. In each case Dasein is understandingly in the way that it can be. Resoluteness has turned out to be a kind of existing which is primordial and authentic. Proximally and for the most part, to be sure, Dasein remains irresolute; that is to say, it remains closed off in its ownmost potentialityfor-Being, to which it brings itself only when it has been individualized. This implies that temporality does not temporalize itself constantly out of the authentic future. This inconstancy, however, does not mean that temporality sometimes lacks a future, but rather that the temporalizing of the future takes various forms. BTMR §68

How is the inauthentic future to be contrasted with this? Just as the authentic future is revealed in resoluteness, the inauthentic future, as an ecstatical MODE, can reveal itself only if we go back ontologically from the inauthentic understanding of everyday concern to its existential-temporal meaning. As care, Dasein is essentially ahead of itself. Proximally and for the most part, concernful Being-in-the-world understands itself in terms of that with which it is concerned. Inauthentic understanding projects itself upon that with which one can concern oneself, or Upon what is feasible, urgent, or indispensable in our everyday business. But that with which we concern ourselves is as it is for the sake of that potentiality-for-Being which cares. This potentiality lets Dasein come towards itself in its concernful Being-alongside that with which it is concerned. Dasein does not come towards itself primarily in its ownmost non-relational potentiality-for-Being, but it awaits this concernfully in terms of that which yields or denies the object of its concern. Dasein comes towards itself from that with which it concerns itself. The inauthentic future has the character of awaiting. One’s concernful understanding of oneself as they-self in terms of what one does, has its possibility ‘based’ upon this ecstatical MODE of the future. And only because factical. Dasein is thus awaiting its potentialityfor-Being, and is awaiting this potentiality in terms of that with which it concerns itself, can it expect anything and wait for it (erwarten und warten auf …). In each case some sort of awaiting must have disclosed the horizon and the range from which something can be expected. Expecting is founded upon awaiting, and is a MODE of that future which temporalizes itself authentically as anticipation. Hence there lies in anticipation a more primordial Being-towards-death than in the concernful expecting of it. BTMR §68

Understanding, as existing in the potentiality-for-Being, however it may have been projected, is primarily futural. But it would not temporalize itself if it were not temporal – that is, determined with equal primordiality by having been and by the Present. The way in which the latter ecstasis helps constitute inauthentic understanding, has already been made plain in a rough and ready fashion. Everyday concern understands itself in terms of that potentiality-for-Being which confronts it as coming from its possible success or failure with regard to whatever its object of concern may be. Corresponding to the inauthentic future (awaiting), there is a special way of Being-alongside the things with which one concerns oneself. This way of Being-alongside is the Present – the “waiting-towards”; this ecstatical MODE reveals itself if we adduce for comparison this very same ecstasis, but in the MODE of authentic temporality. To the anticipation which goes with resoluteness, there belongs a Present in accordance with which a resolution discloses the Situation. In resoluteness, the Present is not only brought back from distraction with the objects of one’s closest concern, but it gets held in the future and in having been. That Present Which is held in authentic temporality and which thus is authentic itself, we call the “moment of vision”. This term must be understood in the active sense as an ecstasis. It means the resolute rapture with which Dasein is carried away to whatever possibilities and circumstances are encountered in the Situation as possible objects of concern, but a rapture which is held in resoluteness. The moment of vision is a phenomenon which in principle (SZ:338) can not be clarified in terms of the “now” (dem Jetzt). The “now” is a temporal phenomenon which belongs to time as within-time-ness: the “now” ‘in which’ something arises, passes away, or is present-at-hand. ‘In the moment of vision’ nothing can occur; but as an authentic Present or waiting-towards, the moment of vision permits us to encounter for the first time what can be ‘in a time’ as ready-to-hand or present-at-hand. BTMR §68

Inauthentic understanding temporalizes itself as an awaiting which makes present (gegenwärtigendes Geswärtigen) – an awaiting to whose ecstatical unity there must belong a corresponding “having been”. The authentic coming-towards-oneself of anticipatory resoluteness is at the sametime a coming-back to one’s ownmost Self, which has been thrown into its individualization. This ecstasis makes it possible for Dasein to be able to take over resolutely that entity which it already is. In anticipating, Dasein brings itself again forth into its ownmost potentiality-for-Being. If Being-as-having-been is authentic, we call it “repetition”. But when one projects oneself inauthentically towards those possibilities which have been drawn from the object of concern in making it present, this is possible only because Dasein has forgotten itself in its ownmost thrown potentiality-for-Being. This forgetting is not nothing, nor is it just a failure to remember; it is rather a ‘positive’ ecstatical MODE of one’s having been – a MODE with a character of its own. The ecstasis (rapture) of forgetting has the character of backing away in the face of one’s ownmost “been”, and of doing so in a manner which is closed off from itself – in such a manner, indeed, that this backing-away closes off ecstatically that in the face of which one is (SZ:339) backing away, and thereby closes itself off too. Having forgotten (Vergessenheit) as an inauthentic way of having been, is thus related to that thrown Being which is one’s own; it is the temporal meaning of that Being in accordance with which I am proximally and for the most part as-having-been. Only on the basis of such forgetting can anything be retained (behalten) by the concernful making-present which awaits; and what are thus retained are entities encountered within-the-world with a character other than that of Dasein. To such retaining there corresponds a non-retaining which presents us with a kind of ‘forgetting’ in a derivative sense. BTMR §68

Just as expecting is possible only on the basis of awaiting, remembering is possible only on that of forgetting, and not vice versa; for in the MODE of having-forgotten, one’s having been ‘discloses’ primarily the horizon into which a Dasein lost in the ‘superficiality’ of its object of concern, can bring itself by remembering. The awaiting which forgets and makes present is an ecstatical unity in its own right, in accordance with which inauthentic understanding temporalizes itself with regard to its temporality. The unity of these ecstases closes off one’s authentic potentiality-for-Being, and is thus the existential condition for the possibility of irresoluteness. Though inauthentic concernful understanding determines itself in the light of making present the object of concern, the temporalizing of the understanding is performed primarily in the future. BTMR §68

We have emphasized that while moods, of course, are ontically wellknown to us (bekannt), they are not recognized (erkannt) in their primordial existential function. They are regarded as fleeting Experiences which ‘colour’ one’s whole ‘psychical condition’. Anything which is observed to have the character of turning up and disappearing in a fleeting manner, belongs to the primordial constancy of existence. But all the same, what should moods have in common with ‘time’? That these ‘Experiences’ come and go, that they run their course ‘in time’, is a trivial thing to establish. Certainly. And indeed this can be established in an ontico-psychological manner. Our task, however, is to exhibit the ontological structure of having-a-mood in its existential-temporal Constitution. And of course this is proximally just a matter of first making the temporality of moods visible. The thesis that ‘one’s state-of-mind is grounded primarily in having been’ means that the existentially basic character of moods lies in bringing one back to something. This bringing-back does not first produce a having been; but in any state-of-mind some MODE of having been is made manifest for existential analysis. So if we are to Interpret states-of-mind temporally, our aim is not one of deducing moods from temporality and dissolving them into pure phenomena of temporalizing. All we have to do is to demonstrate that except on the basis of temporality, moods are not possible in what they ‘signify’ in an existentiell way or in how they ‘signify’ it. Our temporal Interpretation will restrict itself to the phenomena of fear and anxiety, which we have already analysed in a preparatory manner. (SZ:341) BTMR §68

We shall begin our analysis by exhibiting the temporality of fear. Fear has been characterized as an inauthentic state-of-mind. To what extent does the existential meaning which makes such a state-of-mind possible lie in what has been? Which MODE of this ecstasis designates the specific temporality of fear? Fear is a fearing in the face of something threatening – of something which is detrimental to Dasein’s factical potentiality-for-Being, and which brings itself close in the way we have described, within the range of the ready-to-hand and the present-at-hand with which we concern ourselves. Fearing discloses something threatening, and it does so by way of everyday circumspection. A subject which merely beholds would never be able to discover anything of the sort. But if something is disclosed when one fears in the face of it, is not this disclosure a letting-something-come-towards-oneself (ein Auf-sich-zukommenlassen)? Has not “fear” been rightly defined as “the expectation of some oncoming evil” (eines ankommenden Übels) (“malum futurum”)? Is not the primary meaning of fear the future, and least of all, one’s having been? Not only does fearing ‘relate’ itself to ‘something future’ in the signification of something which first comes on ‘in time’; but this self-relating is itself futural in the primordially temporal sense. All this is incontestable. Manifestly an awaiting is one of the things that belong to the existential-temporal Constitution of fear. But proximally this just means that the temporality of fear is one that is inauthentic. Is fearing in the face of something merely an expecting of something threatening which is coming on? Such an expectation need not be fear already, and it is so far from being fear that the specific character which fear as a ‘mood possesses is missing. This character lies in the fact that in fear the awaiting lets what is threatening come back (zurückkommen) to one’s factically concernful potentiality-for-Being. Only if that to which this comes back is already ecstatically open, can that which threatens be awaited right back to the entity which I myself am; only so can my Dasein be threatened. The awaiting which fears is one which is afraid ‘for itself’; that is to say, fearing in the face of something, is in each case, a fearing about; therein lies the character of fear as mood and as affect. When one’s Being-in-the-world has been threatened and it concerns itself with the ready-to-hand, it does so as a factical potentiality-for-Being of its own. In the face of this potentiality one backs away in bewilderment, and this kind of forgetting oneself is what constitutes the existential-temporal meaning of fear. Aristotle rightly defines “fear” as lype tis he tarache – as “a kind of depression or bewilderment”. This depression forces Dasein back to its thrownness, but in such a way that this thrownness gets quite closed off. The bewilderment is based upon a forgetting. When one forgets and backs away in the face of a factical potentiality-for-Being which is resolute, one clings to those possibilities of self-preservation and evasion which one has already discovered circumspectively beforehand. When concern is afraid, it leaps from next to next, because it forgets itself and therefore does not take hold of any definite possibility. Every ‘possible’ possibility offers itself, and this means that the impossible ones do so too. The man who fears, does not stop with any of these; his ‘environment’ does not disappear, but it is encountered without his knowing his way about in it any longer. This bewildered making-present of the first thing that comes into one’s head, is something that belongs with forgetting oneself in fear. It is well known, for instance, that the inhabitants of a burning house will often ‘save’ the most indifferent things that are most closely ready-to-hand. When one has forgotten oneself and makes present a jumble of hovering possibilities, one thus makes possible that bewilderment which goes to make up the mood-character of fear. The having forgotten which goes with such bewilderment modifies the awaiting too and gives it the character of a depressed or bewildered awaiting which is distinct from any pure expectation. (SZ:342) BTMR §68

The specific ecstatical unity which makes it existentially possible to be afraid, temporalizes itself primarily out of the kind of forgetting characterized above, which, as a MODE of having been, modifies its Present and its future in their own temporalizing. The temporality of fear is a forgetting which awaits and makes present. The common-sense interpretation of fear, taking its orientation from what we encounter within-the-world, seeks in the first instance to designate the ‘oncoming evil’ as that in the face of which we fear, and, correspondingly, to define our relation to this evil as one of “expecting”. Anything else which belongs to the phenomenon remains a ‘feeling of pleasure or displeasure’. BTMR §68

Anxiety discloses an insignificance of the world; and this insignificance reveals the nullity of that with which one can concern oneself – or, in other words, the impossibility of projecting oneself upon a potentialityfor-Being which belongs to existence and which is founded primarily upon one’s objects of concern. The revealing of this impossibility, however, signifies that one is letting the possibility of an authentic potentiality-for-Being be lit up. What is the temporal meaning of this revealing? Anxiety is anxious about naked Dasein as something that has been thrown into uncanniness. It brings one back to the pure “that-it-is” of one’s ownmost individualized thrownness. This bringing-back has neither the character of an evasive forgetting nor that of a remembering. But just as little does anxiety imply that one has already taken over one’s existence into one’s resolution and done so by a repeating. On the contrary, anxiety brings one back to one’s thrownness as something possible which can be repeated. And in this way it also reveals the possibility of an authentic potentialityfor-Being – a potentiality which must, in repeating, come back to its thrown “there”, but come back as something fatural which comes towards (zukünftiges). The character of having been is constitutive for the state-of-mind of anxiety; and bringing one face to face with repeatability is the specific ecstatical MODE of this character. BTMR §68

(SZ:345) But may not the thesis of the temporality of moods hold only for those phenomena which we have selected for our analysis? How is a temporal meaning to be found in the pallid lack of mood which dominates the ‘grey everyday’ through and through? And how about the temporality of such moods and affects as hope, joy, enthusiasm, gaiety? Not only fear and anxiety, but other moods, are founded existentially upon one’s haying been; this becomes plain if we merely mention such phenomena as satiety, sadness, melancholy, and desperation. Of course these must be Interpreted on the broader basis of an existential analytic of Dasein that has been well worked out. But even a phenomenon like hope, which seems to be founded wholly upon the future, must be analysed in much the same way as fear. Hope has sometimes been characterized as the expectation of a bonum futurum, to distinguish it from fear, which relates itself to a malum futurum. But what is decisive for the structure of hope as a phenomenon, is not so much the ‘futural’ character of that to which it relates itself but rather the existential meaning of hoping itself. Even here its character as a mood lies primarily in hoping as hoping for something for oneself (Fürsich-erhoffen). He who hopes takes himself with him into his hope, as it were, and brings himself up against what he hopes for. But this presupposes that he has somehow arrived at himself. To say that hope brings alleviation (erleichtert) from depressing misgivings, means merely that even hope, as a state-of-mind, is still related to our burdens, and related in the MODE of Being-as-having been. Such a mood of elation – or better, one which elates – is ontologically possible only if Dasein has an ecstatico-temporal relation to the thrown ground of itself. BTMR §68

Furthermore, the pallid lack of mood – indifference – which is addicted to nothing and has no urge for anything, and which abandons itself to whatever the day may bring, yet in so doing takes everything along with it in a certain manner, demonstrates most penetratingly the power of forgetting in the everyday MODE of that concern which is closest to us. Just living along (Das Dahinleben) in a way which ‘lets’ everything ‘be’ as it is, is based on forgetting and abandoning oneself to one’s thrownness. It has the ecstatical meaning of an inauthentic way of having been. Indifference, which can go along with busying oneself head over heels, must be sharply distinguished from equanimity. This latter mood springs from resoluteness, which, in a moment of vision, looks at those Situations which are possible in one’s potentiality-for-Being-a-whole as disclosed in our anticipation of (zum) death. BTMR §68

Only an entity which, in accordance with the meaning of its Being, finds itself in a state-of-mind (sich befindet) – that is to say, an entity, which in existing, is as already having been, and which exists in a constant MODE of what has been – can become affected. Ontologically such affection presupposes making-present, and indeed in such a manner that in this making-present Dasein can be brought back to itself as something that has been. It remains a problem in itself to define ontologically the way in which the senses can be stimulated or’ touched in something that merely has life, and how and where the Being of animals, for instance, is constituted by some kind of ‘time’. (SZ:346) BTMR §68

Through the awaiting which leaps after, on the other hand, the making-present is abandoned more and more to itself. It makes present for the sake of the Present. It thus entangles itself in itself, so that the distracted not-tarrying’ becomes never-dwelling-anywhere. This latter MODE of the Present is the counter-phenomenon at, the opposite extreme from the moment of vision. In never dwelling anywhere, Being-there is everywhere and nowhere. The moment of vision, however, brings existence into the Situation and discloses the authentic ‘there’. BTMR §68

As a MODE of temporalizing, the ‘leaping-away’ of the Present is grounded in the essence of temporality, which is finite. Having been thrown into Being-towards-death, Dasein flees – proximally and for the most part – in the face of this thrownness, which has been more or less explicitly revealed. The Present leaps away from its authentic future and from its authentic having been, so that it lets Dasein come to its authentic existence only by taking a detour through that Present. The ‘leaping-away’ of the Present – that is, the falling into lostness – has its source in that primordial authentic temporality itself which makes possible thrown Being-towards-death. BTMR §68

Only through the fact that Being-there is rooted in temporality can we get an insight into the existential possibility of that phenomenon which, at the beginning of our analytic of Dasein, we have designated as its basic state: Being-in-the-world. We had to assure ourselves in the beginning that the structural unity of this phenomenon cannot be torn apart. The question of the basis which makes the unity of this articulated structure possible, remained in the background. With the aim of protecting this phenomenon from those tendencies to split it up which were the most obvious and therefore the most baleful, we gave a rather thorough Interpretation of that everyday MODE of Being-in-the-world which is closest to us – concernful Being alongside the ready-to-hand within-the-world. Now that care itself has been defined ontologically and traced back to temporality as its existential ground, concern can in turn be conceived explicitly in terms of either care or temporality. BTMR §69

In the first instance our analysis of the temporality of concern sticks to the MODE of having to do with the ready-to-hand circumspectively. Our analysis then pursues the existential-temporal possibility that circumspective concern may be modified into a discovering of entities within-the-world in the sense of certain possibilities of scientific research, and discovering them ‘merely’ by looking at them. Our Interpretation of the temporality of Being alongside what is ready-to-hand and present-at-hand within-the-world – Being alongside circumspectively as well as with theoretical concern – shows us at the same time how this temporality is already the advance condition for that possibility of Being-in-the-world in which Being alongside entities within-the-world is grounded. If we take the temporal Constitution of Being-in-the-world as a theme for analysis, we are led to the following questions: in what way is anything like a world possible at all? in what sense is the world? what does the world transcend, and how does it do so? how are ‘independent’ (“unabhängige”) entities within-the-world ‘connected’ (“hängt” … “zusammen”) with the transcending world? To expound these questions ontologically is not to answer them. On the contrary, what such an exposition accomplishes is the clarification of those structures with regard to which the problem of transcendence must be raised – a clarification which is necessary beforehand. In the existential-temporal Interpretation of Being-in-the-world, three things will be considered: (a) the temporality of circumspective concern; (b) the temporal meaning of the way in which circumspective concern becomes modified into theoretical knowledge of what is present-at-hand within-the-world; (c) the temporal problem of the transcendence of the world. (SZ:352) BTMR §69

The upshot of this is that if in our analysis of dealings we aim at that which is dealt with, then one’s existent Being alongside the entities with which one concerns oneself must be given an orientation not towards some isolated item of equipment which is ready-to-hand, but towards the equipmental totality. This way of taking what is dealt with, is forced upon us also if we consider that character of Being which belongs distinctively to equipment that is ready-to-hand – namely, involvement. We understand the term “involvement” ontologically. The kind of talk in which we say that something has with it an involvement in something, is not meant to establish a fact ontically, but rather to indicate the kind of Being that belongs to what is ready-to-hand. The relational character of involvement – of its ‘with … in …’ – suggests that “an” equipment is ontologically impossible. Of course just a solitary item of equipment may be ready-to-hand while another is missing. But this makes known to us that the very thing that is ready-to-hand belongs to something else. Our concernful dealings can let what is ready-to-hand be encountered circumspectively only if in these dealings we already understand something like the involvement which something has in something. The Being-alongside which discovers circumspectively in concern, amounts to letting something be involved – that is, to projecting an involvement understandingly. Letting things be involved makes up the existential structure of concern. But concern, as Being alongside something, belongs to the essential constitution of care; and care, in turn, is grounded in temporality. If all this is so, then the existential condition of the possibility of letting things be involved must be sought in a MODE of the temporalizing of temporality. (SZ:353) BTMR §69

(SZ:355) And how is it possible to ‘ascertain’ what is missing (Fehlendem) – that is to say, un-ready-to-hand, not just ready-to-hand in an unmanageable way? That which is un-ready-to-hand is discovered circumspectively when we miss it (im Vermissen). The ‘affirmation’ that something is not present-at-hand, is founded upon our missing it; and both our missing it and our affirmation have their own existential presuppositions. Such missing is by no means a not-making-present (Nichtgegenwärtigen); it is rather a deficient MODE of the Present in the sense of the making-unpresent (Ungegenwärtigens) of something which one has expected or which one has’ always had at one’s disposal. If, when one circumspectively lets something be involved, one were not ‘from the outset’ awaiting the object of one’s concern, and if such awaiting did not temporalize itself in a unity with a making-present, then Dasein could never ‘find’ that something is missing (fehlt). BTMR §69

That with which one’s concernful dealings fail to cope, either by producing or procuring something, or even by turning away, holding aloof, or protecting oneself from something, reveals itself in its insurmountability. Concern resigns itself to it. But resigning oneself to something is a MODE peculiar to circumspectively letting it be encountered. On the basis of this kind of discovery concern can come across that which is inconvenient, disturbing, hindering, endangering, or in general resistant in some way. The temporal structure of resigning oneself to something, lies in a nonretaining which awaitingly makes present. In awaitingly making present, one does not, for instance, reckon ‘on’ that which is unsuitable but none the less available. “Not reckoning with” something, is a MODE of “taking into one’s reckoning” that which one cannot cling to. That which one has “not reckoned with” does not get forgotten; it gets retained, so that in its very unsuitability it remains ready-to-hand. That which is ready-to-hand in this manner belongs to the everyday stock or content of the factically disclosed environment. (SZ:356) BTMR §69

When in the course of existential ontological analysis we ask how theoretical discovery ‘arises’ out of circumspective concern, this implies already that we are not making a problem of the ontical history and development of science, or of the factical occasions for it, or of its proximate goals. In seeking the ontological genesis of the theoretical attitude, we are asking which of those conditions implied in Dasein’s state of Being are existentially necessary for the possibility of Dasein’s existing in the way of scientific research. This formulation of the question is aimed at an existential conception of science. This must be distinguished from the ‘logical’ conception which understands science with regard to its results and defines it as ‘something established on an interconnection of true propositions – that is, propositions counted as valid’. The existential conception understands science as a way of existence and thus as a MODE of Being-in-the-world, which discovers or discloses either entities or Being. Yet a fully adequate existential Interpretation of science cannot be carried out until the meaning of Being and the ‘connection’ between Being and truth have been clarified in terms of the temporality of existence. The following deliberations are preparatory to the understanding of this central problematic, within which, moreover, the idea of phenomenology, as distinguished from the preliminary conception of it which we indicated by way of introduction will be developed for the first time. BTMR §69

Circumspection operates in the involvement-relationships of the context of equipment which is ready-to-hand. Moreover, it is subordinate to the guidance of a more or less explicit survey of the equipmental totality of the current equipment-world and of the public environment which belongs to it. This survey is not just one in which things that are present-at-hand are subsequently scraped together. What is essential to it is that one should have a primary understanding of the totality of involvements within which factical concern always takes its start. Such a survey illumines one’s concern, and receives its ‘light’ from that potentiality-for-Being on the part of Dasein for the sake of which concern exists as care. In one’s current using and manipulating, the concernful circumspection which does this ‘surveying’, brings the ready-to-hand closer to Dasein, and does so by interpreting what has been sighted. This specific way of bringing the object of concern close by interpreting it circumspectively, we call “deliberating” (Überlegung). The scheme peculiar to this is the ‘if – then’; if this or that, for instance, is to be produced, put to use, or averted, then some ways and means, circumstances, or opportunities will be needed. Circumspective deliberation illumines Dasein’s current factical situation in the environment with which it concerns itself. Accordingly, such deliberation never merely ‘affirms’ that some entity is present-at-hand or has such and such properties. Moreover, deliberation can be performed even when that which is brought close in it circumspectively is not palpably ready-to-hand and does not have presence within the closest range. Bringing the environment closer in circumispective deliberation has the existential meaning of a making present; for envisaging is only a MODE of this. In envisaging, one’s deliberation catches sight directly of that which is needed but which is un-ready-to-hand. Circumspection which envisages does not relate itself to ‘mere representations’. (SZ:359) BTMR §69

The classical example for the historical development of a science and even for its ontological genesis, is the rise of mathematical physics. What is decisive for its development does not lie in its rather high esteem for the observation of ‘facts’, nor in its ‘application’ of mathematics in determining the character of natural processes; it lies rather in the way in which Nature herself is mathematically projected. In this projection something constantly present-at-hand (matter) is uncovered beforehand, and the horizon is opened so that one may be guided by looking at those constitutive items in it which are quantitatively determinable (motion, force, location, and time). Only ‘in the light’ of a Nature which has been projected in this fashion can anything like a ‘fact’ be found and set up for an experiment regulated and delimited in terms of this projection. The ‘grounding’ of ‘factual science’ was possible only because the researchers understood that in principle there are no ‘bare facts’. In the mathematical projection of Nature, moreover, what is decisive is not primarily the mathematical as such; what is decisive is that this projection discloses something that is a priori. Thus the paradigmatic character of mathematical natural science does not lie in its exactitude or in the fact that it is binding for ‘Everyman’; it consists rather in the fact that the entities which it takes as its theme are discovered in it in the only way in which entities can be discovered – by the prior projection of their state of Being. When the basic concepts of that understanding of Being by which we are guided have been worked out, the clues of its methods, the structure of its way of conceiving things, the possibility of truth and certainty which belongs to it, the ways in which things get grounded or proved, the MODE in which it is binding for us, and the way it is communicated – all these will be Determined. The totality of these items constitutes the full existential conception of science. (SZ:363) BTMR §69

(SZ:385) Fate is that powerless superior power which puts itself in readiness for adversities – the power of projecting oneself upon one’s own Being-guilty, and of doing so reticently, with readiness for anxiety. As such, fate requires as the ontological condition for its possibility, the state of Being of care – that is to say, temporality. Only if death, guilt, conscience, freedom, and finitude reside together equiprimordially in the Being of an entity as they do in care, can that entity exist in the MODE of fate; that is to say, only then can it be historical in the very depths of its existence. BTMR §74

We characterize repetition as a MODE of that resoluteness which hands itself down – the MODE by which Dasein exists explicitly as fate. But if fate constitutes the primordial historicality of Dasein, then history has its essential importance neither in what is past nor in the “today” and its ‘connection’ with what is past, but in that authentic historizing of existence which arises from Dasein’s future. As a way of Being for Dasein, history has its roots so essentially in the future that death, as that possibility of Dasein which we have already characterized, throws anticipatory existence back upon its factical thrownness, and so for the first time imparts to having-been its peculiarly privileged position in the historical. Authentic Being-towards-death – that is to say, the finitude of temporality – is the hidden basis of Dasein’s historicality. Dasein does not first become historical in repetition; but because it is historical as temporal, it can take itself over in its history by repeating. For this, no historiology is as yet needed. BTMR §74

Dasein exists as an entity for which, in its Being, that Being is itself an issue. Essentially ahead of itself, it has projected itself upon its potentiality-for-Being before going on to any mere consideration of itself. In its projection it reveals itself as something which has been thrown. It has been thrownly abandoned to the ‘world’, and falls into it concernfully. As care – that is, as existing in the unity of the projection which has been fallingly thrown – this entity has been disclosed as a “there”. As being with Others, it maintains itself in an average way of interpreting – a way which has been Articulated in discourse and expressed in language. Being-in-the-world has always expressed itself, and as Being alongside entities encountered within-the-world, it constantly expresses itself in addressing itself to the very object of its concern and discussing it. The concern of circumspective common sense is grounded in temporality – indeed in the MODE of a making-present which retains and awaits. Such concern, as concernfully reckoning up, planning, preventing, or taking precautions, always says (whether audibly or not) that something is to happen ‘then’, that something else is to be attended to ‘beforehand’, that what has failed or eluded us ‘on that former occasion’ is something that we must ‘now’ make up for. BTMR §79

In the ‘then’, concern expresses itself as awaiting; in the ‘on that former occasion’, as retaining; in the ‘now’, as making present. In the ‘then’ – but mostly unexpressed – lies the ‘now-not-yet’; that is to say, this is spoken in a making-present which is either awaitingly retentive or awaitingly forgetful. In the ‘on that former occasion’ lurks the ‘now-nolonger’. With this, retaining expresses itself as a making-present which awaits. The ‘then’ and the ‘on that former occasion’ are understood with regard to a ‘now’; that is to say, making present has a peculiar importance. Of course it always temporalizes itself in a unity with awaiting and retaining, even if these may take the modified form of a forgetting which does not await anything; in the MODE of such forgetting, temporality ensnares itself in the Present, which, in making present, says pre-eminently ‘Now! Now!’ That which concern awaits as what is closest to it, gets addressed in the ‘forthwith’ (im “sogleich”); what has been made proximally available or has been lost is addressed in the ‘just-now’ (im “soeben”). The horizon for the retaining which expresses itself in the ‘on that former occasion’ is the ‘earlier’; the horizon for the ‘then’ is the ‘later on’ (‘that which is to come’); the horizon for the ‘now’ is the ‘today’. (SZ:407) BTMR §79

The concern which awaits, retains, and makes present, is one which ‘allows itself’ so much time; and it assigns itself this time concernfully, even without determining the time by any specific reckoning, and before any such reckoning has been done. Here time dates itself in one’s current MODE of allowing oneself time concernfully; and it does so in terms of those very matters with which one concerns oneself environmentally, and which have been disclosed in the understanding with its accompanying state-of-mind – in terms of what one does ‘all day long’. The more Dasein is awaitingly absorbed in the object of its concern and forgets itself in not awaiting itself, the more does even the time which it ‘allows’ itself remain covered up by this way of ‘allowing’. When Dasein is ‘living along’ in an everyday concernful manner, it just never understands itself as running along in a Continuously enduring sequence of pure ‘nows’. By reason of this covering up, the time which Dasein allows itself has gaps in it, as it were. Often we do not bring a ‘day’ together again when we come back to the time which we have ‘used’. But the time which has gaps in it does not go to pieces in this lack-of-togetherness, which is rather a MODE of that temporality which has already been disclosed and stretched along ecstatically. The manner in which the time we have ‘allowed’ ‘runs its course’, and the way in which concern more or less explicitly assigns itself that time, can be properly explained as phenomena only if, on the one hand, we avoid (SZ:410) the theoretical ‘representation’ of a Continuous stream of “nows”, and if, on the other hand, the possible ways in which Dasein assigns itself time and allows itself time are to be conceived of as determined primarily in terms of how Dasein, in a manner corresponding to its current existence, ‘has’ its time. BTMR §79

In an earlier passage authentic and inauthentic existing have been characterized with regard to those MODES of the temporalizing of temporality upon which such existing is founded. According to that characterization, the irresoluteness of inauthentic existence temporalizes itself in the MODE of a making-present which does not await but forgets. He who is irresolute understands himself in terms of those very closest events and be-fallings which he encounters in such a making-present and which thrust themselves upon him in varying ways. Busily losing himself in the object of his concern, he loses his time in it too. Hence his characteristic way of talking – ‘I have no time’. But just as he who exists inauthentically is constantly losing time and never ‘has’ any, the temporality of authentic existence remains distinctive in that such existence, in its resoluteness, never loses time and ‘always has time’. For the temporality of resoluteness has, with relation to its Present, the character of a moment of vision. When such a moment makes the Situation authentically present, this making-present does not itself take the lead, but is held in that future which is in the process of having-been. One’s existence in the moment of vision temporalizes itself as something that has been stretched along in a way which is fatefully whole in the sense of the authentic historical constancy of the Self. This kind of temporal existence has its time for what the Situation demands of it, and it has it ‘constantly’. But resoluteness discloses the “there” in this way only as a Situation. So if he who is resolute encounters anything that has been disclosed, he can never do so in such a way as to lose his time on it irresolutely. BTMR §79

When the ‘then’ which interprets itself in concernful awaiting gets dated, this dating includes some such statement as “then – when it dawns – it is time for one’s daily work”. The time which is interpreted in concern is already understood as a time for something. The current ‘now that so and so …’ is as such either appropriate or inappropriate. Not only is the ‘now’ (and so too any MODE of interpreted time) a ‘now that …’ which is essentially datable; but as such it has essentially, at the same time, the structure of appropriateness or inappropriateness. Time which has been interpreted has by its very nature the character of ‘the time for something’ or ‘the wrong time for something’. When concern makes present by awaiting and retaining, time is understood in relation to a “for-which”; and this in turn is ultimately tied up with a “for-the-sake-of-which” of Dasein’s potentiality-for-Being. With this “in-order-to” relation, the time which has been made public makes manifest that structure with which we have earlier become acquainted as significance, and which constitutes the worldhood of the world. As ‘the time for something’, the time which has been made public has essentially a world-character. Hence the time which makes itself public in the temporalizing of temporality is what we designate as “world-time”. And we designate it thus not because it is presentat-hand as an entity within-the-world (which it can never be), but because it belongs to the world (zur Welt) in the sense which we have Interpreted existential-ontologically. In the following pages we must show how the essential relations of the world-structure (the ‘in-order-to’, for example) are connected with public time (the ‘then, when …’, for example) by reason of the ecstatico-horizonal constitution of temporality. Only now, in any case, can the time with which we concern ourselves be completely characterized as to its structure: it is datable, spanned, and public; and as having this structure, it belongs to the world itself. Every ‘now’, for instance, which is expressed in a natural everyday manner, has this kind of structure, and is understood as such, though pre-conceptually and unthematically, when Dasein concernfully allows itself time. (SZ:415) BTMR §80

The disclosedness of the natural clock belongs to the Dasein which exists as thrown and falling; and in this disclosedness factical Dasein has at the same time already given a distinctive public character to the time with which it concerns itself. As time-reckoning is perfected and the use of clocks becomes more refined, this making-public gets enhanced and strengthened. We shall not give here a historiological presentation of the historical evolution of time-reckoning and the use of clocks, with all its possible variations. We must rather ask in an existential-ontological way what MODE of the temporalizing of Dasein’s temporality becomes manifest in the direction which the development of time-reckoning and clock-using has taken. When this question is answered, there must arise a more primordial understanding of the fact that the measurement of time – and this means also the explicit making-public of time as an object of concerns – is grounded in the temporality of Dasein, and indeed in’ a quite definite temporalizing of that temporality. BTMR §80

But wherein are grounded this levelling-off of world-time and this covering-up of temporality? In the Being of Dasein itself, which we have, in a preparatory manner, Interpreted as care. Thrown and falling, Dasein is proximally and for the most part lost in that with which it concerns itself. In this lostness, however, Dasein’s fleeing in the face of that authentic existence which has been characterized as “anticipatory resoluteness”, has made itself known; and this is a fleeing which covers up. In this concernful fleeing lies a fleeing in the face of death – that is, a looking-away from the end of Being-in-the-world. This looking-away from it, is in itself a MODE of that Being-towards-the-end which is ecstatically futural. The inauthentic temporality of everyday Dasein as it falls, must, as such a looking-away from finitude, fail to recognize authentic futurity and therewith temporality in general. And if indeed the way in which Dasein is ordinarily understood is guided by the “they”, only so can the selfforgetful ‘representation’ of the ‘infinity’ of public time be strengthened. The “they” never dies because it cannot die; for death is in each case mine, and only in anticipatory resoluteness does it get authentically understood in an existentiell manner. Nevertheless, the “they”, which never dies and which misunderstands Being-towards-the-end, gives a characteristic interpretation to fleeing in the face of death. To the very end ‘it always has more time’. Here a way of “having time” in the sense that one can lose it makes itself known. ‘Right now, this! then that! And that is barely over, when …’ Here it is not as if the finitude of time were getting understood; quite the contrary, for concern sets out to snatch as much as possible from the time which still keeps coming and ‘goes on’. Publicly, time is something which everyone takes and can take. In the everyday way in which we are with one another, the levelled-off sequence of “nows” remains completely unrecognizable as regards its origin in the temporality of the individual Dasein. How is ‘time’ in its course to be touched even the least bit when a man who has been present-at-hand ‘in time’ no longer exists? Time goes on, just as indeed it already ‘was’ when a man ‘came into life’. The only time one knows is the public time which has been levelled off and which belongs to everyone – and that means, to nobody. (SZ:425) BTMR §81

Our existential analytic of Dasein, on the contrary, starts with the ‘concretion’ of factically thrown existence itself in order to unveil temporality as that which primordially makes such existence possible. ‘Spirit’ does not first fall into time, but it exists as the primordial temporalizing of temporality. Temporality temporalizes world-time, within the horizon of which ‘history’ can ‘appear’ as historizing within-time. ‘Spirit’ does not fall into’ time; but ‘factical existence ‘falls’ as falling from primordial, authentic temporality. This ‘falling’ (“Fallen”), however, has itself its existential possibility in a MODE of its temporalizing – a MODE which belongs to temporality. (SZ:436) BTMR §82

Something like ‘Being’ has been disclosed in the understanding-of-Being which belongs to existent Dasein as a way in which it understands. Being has been disclosed in a preliminary way, though non-conceptually; and this makes it possible for Dasein as existent Being-in-the-world to comport itself towards entities – towards those which it encounters within-the-world as well as towards itself as existent. How is this disclosive understanding of Being at all possible for Dasein? Can this question be answered by going back to the primordial constitution-of-Being of that Dasein by which Being is understood? The existential-ontological constitution of Dasein’s totality is grounded in temporality. Hence the ecstatical projection of Being must be made possible by some primordial way in which ecstatical temporality temporalizes. How is this MODE of the temporalizing of temporality to be Interpreted? Is there a way which leads from primordial time to the meaning of Being? Does time itself manifest itself as the horizon of Being? BTMR §83

We shall point to temporality as the meaning of the Being of that entity which we call “Dasein”. If this is to be demonstrated, those structures of Dasein which we shall provisionally exhibit must be Interpreted over again as MODES of temporality. In thus interpreting Dasein as temporality, however, we shall not give the answer to our leading question as to the meaning of BeinBeing in general. But the ground will have been prepared for obtaining such an answer. BTMR §5

If Being is to be conceived in terms of time, and if, indeed, its various MODES and derivatives are to become intelligible in their respective modifications and derivations by taking time into consideration, then Being itself (and not merely entities, let us say, as entities ‘in time’) is thus made visible in its ‘temporal’ character. But in that case, ‘temporal’ can no longer mean simply ‘being in time’. Even the ‘non-temporal’ and the ‘supra-temporal’ are ‘temporal’ with regard to their Being, and not just privatively by contrast with something ‘temporal’ as an entity ‘in time’, but in a positive sense, though it is one which we must first explain. In both pre-philosophical and philosophical usage the expression ‘temporal’ has been pre-empted by the signification we have cited; in the following investigations, however, we shall employ it for another signification. Thus the way in which Being and its MODES and characteristics have their meaning determined primordially in terms of time, is what we shall call its “Temporal” determinateness. Thus the fundamental ontological task of Interpreting Being as such includes working out the Temporality of Being. In the exposition of the problematic of Temporality the question of the meaning of Being will first be concretely answered. (SZ:19) BTMR §5

Furthermore, in each case Dasein is mine to be in one way or another. Dasein has always made some sort of decision as to the way in which it is in each case mine (je meines). That entity which in its Being has this very Being as an issue, comports itself towards its Being as its ownmost possibility. In each case Dasein is its possibility, and it ‘has’ this possibility, but not just as a property (eigenschaftlich), as something present-at-hand would. And because Dasein is in each case essentially its own possibility, it can, in its very Being, ‘choose’ itself and win itself; it can also lose itself and never win itself; or only ‘seem’ to do so. But only in so far as it is essentially something which can be authentic – that is, something of its own – can it have lost itself and not yet won itself. As MODES of Being, authenticity and inauthenticity (these expressions have been chosen terminologically in a strict sense) are both grounded in the fact that any Dasein whatsoever is characterized by mineness. But the inauthenticity of Dasein does not signify any ‘less’ Being or any ‘lower’ degree of Being. Rather it is the case that even in its fullest concretion Dasein can be characterized by inauthenticity – when busy, when excited, when interested, when ready for enjoyment. (SZ:43) BTMR §9

All explicata to which the analytic of Dasein gives rise are obtained by considering Dasein’s existence-structure. Because Dasein’s characters of Being are defined in terms of existentiality, we call them “existentialia”. These are to be sharply distinguished from what we call “categories” – characteristics of Being for entities whose character is not that of Dasein. Here we are taking the expression “category” in its primary ontological signification, and abiding by it. In the ontology of the ancients, the entities we encounter within the world are taken as the basic examples for the interpretation of Being. noein (or the logos, as the case may be) is accepted as a way of ‘access to them. Entities are encountered therein. But the Being of these entities must be something which can be grasped in a distinctive kind of legein (letting something be seen), so that this Being becomes intelligible in advance as that which it is – and as that which it is already in every entity. In any discussion (logos) of entities, we have previously addressed ourselves to Being; this addressing is kategoresthai. This signifies, in the first instance, making a public accusation, taking someone to task for something in the presence of everyone. When used ontologically, this term means taking an entity to task, as it were, for whatever it is as an entity – that is to say, letting everyone see it in its Being. The kategoriai are what is sighted and what is visible in such a seeing. They include the various ways in which the nature of those entities which can be addressed and discussed in a logos may be (SZ:45) determined a priori. Existentialia and categories are the two basic possibilities for characters of Being. The entities which correspond to them require different kinds of primary interrogation respectively: any entity is either a “who” (existence) or a “what” (presence-at-hand in the broadest sense). The connection between these two MODES of the characters of Being cannot be handled until the horizon for the question of Being has been clarified. BTMR §9

In our preparatory discussions (Section 9) we have brought out some characteristics of Being which will provide us with a steady light for our further investigation, but which will at the same time become structurally concrete as that investigation continues. Dasein is an entity which, in its very Being, comports itself understandingly towards that Being. In saying this, we are calling attention to the formal concept of existence. Dasein exists. Furthermore, Dasein is an entity which in each case I myself am. Mineness belongs to any existent Dasein, and belongs to it as the condition which makes authenticity and inauthenticity possible. In each case Dasein exists in one or the other of these two MODES, or else it is modally undifferentiated. BTMR §12

Dasein’s facticity is such that its Being-in-the-world has always dispersed (zerstreut) itself or even split itself up into definite ways of Being-in. The multiplicity of these is indicated by the following examples: having to do with something, producing something, attending to something and looking after it, making use of something, giving something up and letting it go, undertaking, accomplishing, evincing, interrogating, considering, discussing, determining… . All these ways of Being-in have concern as their kind of Being – a kind of Being which we have yet to characterize in detail. Leaving undone, neglecting, renouncing, taking a rest – these too are ways of concern; but these are all deficient MODES, in which the possibilities of concern are kept to a ‘bare minimum’. The term ‘concern’ has, in the first instance, its colloquial (vorwissenschaftliche) signification, and can mean to carry out something, to get it done (erledigen), to ‘straighten it out’. It can also mean to ‘provide oneself with something’. We use the expression with still another characteristic turn of phrase when we say “I am concerned for the success of the undertaking.” Here ‘concern’ means something like apprehensiveness. In contrast to these colloquial ontical significations, the expression ‘concern’ will be used in this investigation as an ontological term for an existentiale, and will designate the Being of a possible way of Being-in-the-world. This term has been chosen not because Dasein happens to be proximally and to a large extent ‘practical’ and economic, but because the Being of Dasein itself (SZ:57) is to be made visible as care. This expression too is to be taken as an ontological structural concept. (See Chapter 6 of this Division.) It has nothing to do with ‘tribulation’, ‘melancholy’, or the ‘cares of life’, though ontically one can come across these in every Dasein. These – like their opposites, ‘gaiety’ and ‘freedom from care’ – are ontically possible only because Dasein, when understood ontologically, is care. Because Being-in-the-world belongs essentially to Dasein, its Being towards the world (Sein zur Welt) is essentially concern. BTMR §12

To the everydayness of Being-in-the-world there belong certain MODES of concern. These permit the entities with which we concern ourselves to be encountered in such a way that the worldly character of what is within-the-world comes to the fore. When we concern ourselves with something, the entities which are most closely ready-to-hand may be met as something unusable, not properly adapted for the use we have decided upon. The tool turns out to be damaged, or the material unsuitable. In each of these cases equipment is here, ready-to-hand. We discover its unusability, however, not by looking at it and establishing its properties, but rather by the circumspection of the dealings in which we use it. When its unusability is thus discovered, equipment becomes conspicuous. This conspicuousness (SZ:73) presents the ready-to-hand equipment as in a certain un-readiness-to-hand. But this implies that what cannot be used just lies there; it shows itself as an equipmental Thing which looks so and so, and which, in its readiness-to-hand as looking that way, has constantly been present-at-hand too. Pure presence-at-hand announces itself in such equipment, but only to withdraw to the readiness-to-hand of something with which one concerns oneself – that is to say, of the sort of thing we find when we put it back into repair. This presence-at-hand of something that cannot be used is still not devoid of all readiness-to-hand whatsoever; equipment which is present-at-hand in this way which is still not just a Thing which occurs somewhere. The damage to the equipment is still not a mere alteration of a Thing – not a change of properties which just occurs in something present-at-hand. BTMR §16

The MODES of conspicuousness, obtrusiveness, and obstinacy all have the function of bringing to the fore the characteristic of presence-at-hand in what is ready-to-hand. But the ready-to-hand is not thereby just observed and stared at as something present-at-hand; the presence-at-hand which makes itself known is still bound up in the readiness-to-hand of equipment. Such equipment still does not veil itself in the guise of mere Things. It becomes ‘equipment’ in the sense of something which one would like to shove out of the way. But in such a Tendency to shove things aside, the ready-to-hand shows itself as still ready-to-hand in its unswerving presence-at-hand. BTMR §16

That the world does not ‘consist’ of the ready-to-hand shows itself in the fact (among others) that whenever the world is lit up in the MODES of concern which we have been Interpreting, the ready-to-hand becomes deprived of its worldhood so that Being-just-present-at-hand comes to the fore. If, in our everyday concern with the ‘environment’, it is to be possible for equipment ready-to-hand to be encountered in its ‘Being-in-itself’ (in seinem “An-sich-sein”), then those assignments and referential totalities in which our circumspection ‘is absorbed’ cannot become a theme for that circumspection any more than they can for grasping things ‘thematically’ but non-circumspectively. If it is to be possible for the ready-to-hand not to emerge from its inconspicuousness, the world must not announce itself. And it is in this that the Being-in-itself of entities which are ready-to-hand has its phenomenal structure constituted. BTMR §16

Matter may have such definite characteristics as hardness, weight, and colour; (durities, pondus, color); but these can all be taken away from it, and it still remains what it is. These do not go to make up its real Being; and in so far as they are, they turn out to be MODES of extensio. Descartes tries to show this in detail with regard to ‘hardness’: “Nam, quantum ad duritiem, nihil aliud de illa sensus nobis indicat, quam partes durorum corporum resistere molui manuum nostrarum, cum in illas incurrant. Si enim, quotiescunque manus nostrae versus aliquam pattern moventur, corpora omnia ibi existentia recederent eadem celeritate qua illae accedunt, nullam unquam duritiem sentiremus. Nec vllo MODO potest intelligi, corpora quae sic recederent, idcirco naturam corporis esse amissura; nee proinde ipsa in duritie consistit.” Hardness is experienced when one feels one’s way by touch (Tasten). What does the sense of touch ‘tell’ us about it? The parts of the hard Thing ‘resist’ a movement of the hand, such as an attempt to push it away. If, however, hard bodies, those which do not give way, should change their locations with the same velocity as that of the hand which ‘strikes at’ them, nothing would ever get touched ( Berühren), and hardness would not be experienced and would accordingly never be. But it is quite incomprehensible that bodies which give way with such velocity should thus forfeit any of their corporeal Being. If they retain this even under a change in velocity which makes it impossible for anything like ‘hardness’ to be, then hardness does not belong to the Being of entities of this sort. “Eademque ratione ostendi potest, et pondus, et colorem, et alias omnes eiusmodi qualitates, quae in materia corporea sentiuntur, ex ea tolli posse, ipsa integra remanente: unde sequitur, a nulla ex illis eius naturam dependere.” Thus what makes up the Being of the res corporea is the extensio: that which is omnimodo dieisibile, figurabile et mobile (that which can change itself by being divided, shaped, or moved in any way), that which is capax mutationum – that which maintains itself (remanet) through all these changes. In any corporeal Thing the real entity is what is suited for thus remaining constant (stdndigen Verbleib), so much so, indeed that this is how the substantiality of such a substance gets characterized. (SZ:92) BTMR §19

One might retort, however, that even if in point of fact both the problem of the world and the Being of the entities encountered environmentally as closest to us remain concealed, Descartes has still laid the basis for characterizing ontologically that entity within-the-world upon which, in its very Being, every other entity is founded – material Nature. This would be the fundamental stratum upon which all the other strata of actuality within-the-world are built up. The extended Thing as such would serve, in the first instance, as the ground for those definite characters which show themselves, to be sure, as qualities, but which ‘at bottom’ are quantitative modifications ‘of the MODES of the extensio itself. These qualities, which are themselves reducible, would provide the footing for such specific qualities as. “beautiful”, “ugly”, “in keeping”, “not in (SZ:99) keeping,” “useful”, “useless”. If one is oriented primarily by Thinghood, these latter qualities must be taken as non-quantifiable value-predicates by which what is in the first instance just a material Thing, gets stamped as something good. But with this stratification, we come to those entities which we have characterized ontologically as equipment ready-to-hand The Cartesian analysis of the ‘world’ would thus enable us for the first time to build up securely the structure of what is proximally ready-to-hand; all it takes is to round out the Thing of Nature until it becomes a full-fledged Thing of use, and this is easily done. BTMR §21

The readiness-to-hand which belongs to any such region beforehand has the character of inconspicuous familiarity, and it has it in an even more primordial sense than does the Being of the ready-to-hand. The region itself becomes visible in a conspicuous manner only when one discovers the ready-to-hand circumspectively and does so in the deficient MODES of concern. Often the region of a place does not become accessible explicitly as such a region until one fails to find something in its place. The space which is discovered in circumspective Being-in-the-world as the spatiality of the totality of equipment, always belongs to entities themselves as the place of that totality. The bare space itself is still veiled over. Space has been split up into places. But this spatiality has its own unity through that totality-of-involvements in-accordance-with-the-world (weltmässige) which belongs to the spatially ready-to-hand. The ‘environment’ does not arrange itself in a space which has been given in advance; but its specific worldhood, in its significance, Articulates the context of involvements which belongs to some current to tality of circumspectively allotted places. The world at such a time always reveals the spatiality of the space which belongs to it. To encounter the ready-to-hand in its environmental space remains ontically possible only because Dasein itself is ‘spatial’ with regard to its Being-in-the-world. BTMR §22

As de-severant Being-in, Dasein has likewise the character of directionality. Every bringing-close (Näherung) has already taken in advance a direction towards a region out of which what is de-severed brings itself close (sich nähert), so that one can come across it with regard to its place. Circumspective concern is de-severing which gives directionality. In this concern – that is, in the Being-in-the-world of Dasein itself – a supply of ‘signs’ is presented. Signs, as equipment, take over the giving of directions in a way which is explicit and easily manipulable. They keep explicitly open those regions which have been used circumspectively – the particular “whithers” to ‘Which something belongs or goes, or gets brought or fetched. If Dasein is, it already has, as directing and desevering, its own discovered region. Both directionality and de-severance, as MODES of Being-in-the-world, are guided beforehand by the circumspection of concern. BTMR §23

Even ‘concern’ with food and clothing, and the nursing of the sick body, are forms of solicitude. But we understand the expression “solicitude” in a way which corresponds to our use of “concern” as a term for an existentiale. For example, ‘welfare work’ (“Fürsorge”), as a factical social arrangement, is grounded in Dasein’s state of Being as Being-with. Its factical urgency gets its motivation in that Dasein maintains itself proximally and for the most part in the deficient MODES of solicitude. Being for, against, or without one another, passing one another by, not “mattering” to one another – these are possible ways of solicitude. And it is precisely these last-named deficient and Indifferent MODES that characterize everyday, average Being-with-one-another. These MODES of Being show again the characteristics of inconspicuousness and obviousness which belong just as much to the everyday Dasein-with of Others within-the-world as to the readiness-to-hand of the equipment with which one is daily concerned. These Indifferent MODES of Being-with-one-another may easily mislead ontological Interpretation into interpreting this kind of Being, in the first instance, as the mere Being-present-at-hand of several subjects. It seems as if only negligible variations of the same kind of Being lie before us; yet ontologically there is an essential distinction between the ‘indifferent’ way in which Things at random occur together and the way in which entities who are with one another do not “matter” to one another. (SZ:122) BTMR §26

With regard to its positive MODES, solicitude has two extreme possibilities. It can, as it were, take away ‘care’ from the Other and put itself in his position in concern: it can leap in for him. This kind of solicitude takes over for the Other that with which he is to concern himself. The Other is thus thrown out of his own position; he steps back so that afterwards, when the matter has been attended to, he can either take it over as something finished and at his disposal, or disburden himself of it completely. In such solicitude the Other can become one who is dominated and dependent, even if this domination is a tacit one and remains hidden from him. This kind of solicitude, which leaps in and takes away ‘care’, is to a large extent determinative for Being with one another, and pertains for the most part to our concern with the ready-to-hand. BTMR §26

Just as circumspection belongs to concern as a way of discovering what is ready-to-hand, solicitude is guided by considerateness and forbearance. Like solicitude, these can range, through their respective deficient and Indifferent MODES up to the point of inconsiderateness or the perfunctoriness for which indifference leads the way. BTMR §26

But because solicitude dwells proximally and for the most part in the deficient or at least the Indifferent MODES (in the indifference of passing one another by), the kind of knowing-oneself which is essential and closest, demands that one become acquainted with oneself. And when, indeed, one’s knowing-oneself gets lost in such ways as aloofness, hiding oneself away, or putting on a disguise, Being-with-one-another must follow special routes of its own in order to come close to Others, or even to ‘see through them’ (“hinter sie” zu kommen). BTMR §26

Not only is Being towards Others an autonomous, irreducible relationship of Being: this relationship, as Being-with, is one which, with Dasein’s Being, already is. Of course it is indisputable that a lively mutual acquaintanceship on the basis of Being-with, often depends upon how far one’s own Dasein has understood itself at the time; but this means that it depends only upon how far one’s essential Being with Others has made itself transparent and has not disguised itself. And that is possible only if Dasein, as Being-in-the-world, already is with Others. ‘Empathy’ does not first constitute Being-with; only on the basis of Being-with does ‘empathy’ become possible: it gets its motivation from the unsociability of the dominant MODES of Being-with. BTMR §26

In these characters of Being which we have exhibited – everyday Being-among-one-another, distantiality, averageness, levelling down, publicness, the disburdening of one’s Being, and accommodation – lies that ‘constancy’ of Dasein which is closest to us. This “constancy” pertains not to the enduring Being-present-at-hand of something, but rather to Dasein’s kind of Being as Being-with. Neither the Self of one’s own Dasein nor the Self of the Other has as yet found itself or lost itself as long as it is (seiend) in the MODES we have mentioned. In these MODES one’s way of Being is that of inauthenticity and failure to stand by one’s Self. To be in this way signifies no Iessening of Dasein’s facticity, just as the “they”, as the “nobody”, is by no means nothing at all. On the contrary, in this kind of Being, Dasein is an ens realissimum, if by ‘Reality’ we understand a Being that has the character of Dasein. BTMR §27

Under B (the everyday Being of the “there”, and the falling of Dasein) we shall analyse idle talk (Section 35), curiosity (Section 36), and ambiguity (Section 37) as existential MODES of the everyday Being of the “there”; we shall analyse them as corresponding respectively to the constitutive phenomenon of discourse, the sight which lies in understanding, and the interpretation (or explaining (Deutung)) which belongs to understanding. In these phenomenal MODES a basic kind of Being of the “there” will become visible – a kind of Being which we Interpret as falling; and this ‘falling’ shows a movement (Bewegtheit) which is existentially its own. BTMR §28

The different MODES of state-of-mind and the ways in which they are interconnected in their foundations cannot be Interpreted within the problematic of the present investigation. The phenomena have long been well-known ontically under the terms “affects” and “feelings” and have always been under consideration in philosophy. It is not an accident that the earliest systematic Interpretation of affects that has come down to us is not treated in the framework of ‘psychology’. Aristotle investigates the pathe (affects) in the second book of his Rhetoric. Contrary to the traditional orientation, according to which rhetoric is conceived as the kind of thing we ‘learn in school’, this work of Aristotle must be taken as the first systematic hermeneutic of the everydayness of Being with one another. Publicness, as the kind of Being which belongs to the “they” (Cf. Section 27), not only has in general its own way of having a mood, but needs moods and ‘makes’ them for itself. It is into such a mood and out of such a mood that the orator speaks. He must understand the possibilities of moods in order to rouse them and guide them aright. (SZ:139) BTMR §29

One can also fear about Others, and we “then speak of “fearing for” them (Fürchten für sic). This fearing for the Other does not take away his fear. Such a possibility has been ruled out already, because the Other, for whom we fear, need not fear at all on his part. It is precisely when the Other is not afraid and charges recklessly at what is threatening him that we fear most for him. Fearing-for is a way of having a co-state-of-mind with Others, but not necessarily a being-afraid-with or even a fearing-with-one-another. One can “fear about” without “being-afraid”. Yet when viewed more strictly, fearing-about is “being-afraid-for-oneself”. Here what one. “is apprehensive about” is one’s Being-with with the Other, who might be torn away from one. That which is fearsome is not aimed directly at him who fears with someone else. Fearing-about knows that in a certain way it is unaffected, and yet it is co-affected in so far as the Dasein-with for which it fears is affected. Fearing-about is therefore not a weaker form of being-afraid. Here the issue is one of existential MODES, not of degrees of ‘feeling-tones’. Fearing-about does not lose its specific genuiness even if it is not ‘really’ afraid. (SZ:142) BTMR §30

We can make clear the connection of discourse with understanding and intelligibility by considering an existential possibility which belongs to talking itself-hearing. If we have not heard ‘aright’, it is not by accident that we say we have not ‘understood’. Hearing is constitutive for discourse. And just as linguistic utterance is based on discourse, so is acoustic perception on hearing. Listening to … is Dasein’s existential way of Being-open as Being-with for Others. Indeed, hearing constitutes the primary and authentic way in which Dasein is open for its ownmost potentiality-for-Being – as in hearing the voice of the friend whom every Dasein carries with it. Dasein hears, because it understands. As a Being-in-the-world with Others, a Being which understands, Dasein is ‘in thrall’ to Dasein-with and to itself; and in this thraldom it “belongs” to these. Being-with develops in listening to one another (Aufeinander-hören), which can be done in several possible ways: following, going along with, and the privative MODES of not-hearing, resisting, defying, and turning away. BTMR §34

Idle talk controls even the ways in which one may be curious. It says what one “must” have read and seen. In being everywhere and nowhere, curiosity is delivered over to idle talk. These two everyday MODES of Being for discourse and sight are not just present-at-hand side by side in their tendency to uproot, but either of these ways-to-be drags the other one with it. Curiosity, for which nothing is closed off, and idle talk, for which there is nothing that is not understood, provide themselves (that is, the Dasein which is in this manner (dem so seienden Dasein)) with the guarantee of a ‘life’ which, supposedly, is genuinely ‘lively’. But with this supposition a third phenomenon now shows itself, by which the disclosedness of everyday Dasein is characterized. BTMR §36

In our pursuit of the tasks of a preparatory existential analytic of Dasein, there emerged an Interpretation of understanding, meaning, and interpretation. Our analysis of Dasein’s disclosedness showed further that, with this disclosedness, Dasein, in its basic state of Being-in-the-world, has been, revealed equiprimordially with regard to the world, Being-in, and the Self. Furthermore, in the factical disclosedness of the world, entities within-the-world are discovered too. This implies that the Being of these entities is always understood in a certain manner, even if it is not conceived in a way which is appropriately ontological. To be sure, the pre-ontological understanding of Being embraces all entities which are essentially disclosed in Dasein; but the understanding of Being has not yet Articulated itself in a way which corresponds to the various MODES of Being. (SZ:201) BTMR §43

At the same time our interpretation of understanding has shown that, in accordance with its falling kind of Being, it has, proximally and for the most part, diverted itself (sich … verlegt) into an understanding of the ‘world’. Even where the issue is not only one of ontical experience but also one of ontological understanding, the interpretation of Being takes its orientation in the first instance from the Being of entities within-the-world. Thereby the Being of what is proximally ready-to-hand gets passed over, and entities are first conceived as a context of Things (res) which are present-at-hand. “Being” acquires the meaning of “Reality”. Substantiality becomes the basic characteristic of Being. Corresponding to this way in which the understanding of Being has been diverted, even the ontological understanding of Dasein moves into the horizon of this conception of Being. Like any other entity, Dasein too is present-at-hand as Real. In this way “Being in general” acquires the meaning of “Reality”. Accordingly the concept of Reality has a peculiar priority in the ontological problematic. By this priority the route to a genuine existential analytic of Dasein gets diverted, and so too does our very view of the Being of what is proximally ready-to-hand within-the-world. It finally forces the general problematic of Being into a direction that lies off the course. The other MODES of Being become defined negatively and privatively with regard to Reality. BTMR §43

”Reality”, as an ontological term, is one which we have related to entities within-the-world. If it serves to designate this kind of Being in general, then readiness-to-hand and presence-at-hand function as MODES of Reality. If, however, one lets this word have its traditional signification, then it stands for Being in the sense of the pure presence-at-hand of Things. But not all presence-at-hand is the presence-at-hand of Things. The ‘Nature’ by which we are ‘surrounded’ is, of course, an entity within-the-world; but the kind of Being which it shows belongs neither to the ready-to-hand nor to what is present-at-hand as ‘Things of Nature’. No matter how this Being of ‘Nature’ may be Interpreted, all the MODES of Being of entities within-the-world are founded ontologically upon the worldhood of the world, and accordingly upon the phenomenon of Being-in-the-world. From this there arises the insight that among the MODES of Being of entities within-the-world, Reality has no priority, and that Reality is a kind of Being which cannot even characterize anything like the world or Dasein in a way which is ontologically appropriate. BTMR §43

Entities with Dasein’s kind of Being cannot be conceived in terms of Reality and substantiality; we have expressed this by the thesis that the substance of man is existence. Yet if we have Interpreted existentiality as care, and distinguished this from Reality, this does not signify that our existential analytic is at an end; we have merely allowed the intricate problems of the question of Being and its possible MODES, and the question of the meaning of such modifications, to emerge more sharply: only if the understanding of Being is, do entities as entities become accessible; only if entities are of Dasein’s kind of Being is the understanding of Being possible as an entity. BTMR §43

The answer to the question of the meaning of Being has yet to be given (steht … aus). What has our fundamental analysis of Dasein, as we have carried it out so far, contributed to working out this question? By laying bare the phenomenon of care, we have clarified the state of Being of that entity to whose Being something like an understanding of Being belongs. At the same time the Being of Dasein has thus been distinguished from MODES of Being (readiness-to-hand, presence-at-hand, Reality) which. characterize entities with a character other than that of Dasein. Understanding has itself been elucidated; and at the same time the methodological transparency of the procedure of Interpreting Being by understanding it and interpreting it, has thus been guaranteed. BTMR §44

The possibility of this entity’s Being-a-whole is manifestly inconsistent with the ontological meaning of care, and care is that which forms the totality of Dasein’s structural whole. Yet the primary item in care is the ‘ahead-of-itself ‘, and this means that in every case Dasein exists for the sake of itself. ‘As long as it is’, right to its end, it comports itself towards its potentiality-for-Being. Even when it still exists but has nothing more ‘before it’ and has ‘settled (abgeschlossen) its account’, its. Being is still determined by the ‘ahead-of-itself’. Hopelessness, for instance, does not tear Dasein away from its possibilities, but is only one of its own MODES of Being towards these possibilities. Even when one is without Illusions and ‘is ready for anything’ (“Gefasstsein auf Alles”), here too the ‘ahead-of-itself’ lies hidden. The ‘ahead-of-itself ‘, as an item in the structure of care, tells us unambiguously that in Dasein there is always something still outstanding, which, as a potentiality-for-Being for Dasein itself, has not yet become ‘actual’. It is essential to the basic constitution of Dasein that there is constantly something still to be settled (eine ständige Unabgeschlossenheit). Such a lack of totality signifies that there is something still outstanding in one’s potentiality-for-Being. BTMR §46

Indisputably, the fact that one Dasein can be represented by another belongs to its possibilities of Being in Being-with-one-another in the world. In everyday concern, constant and manifold use is made of such representability. Whenever we go anywhere or have anything to contribute, we can be represented by someone within the range of that ‘environment’ with which we are most closely concerned. The great multiplicity of ways of Being-in-the-world in which one person can be represented by another, not only extends to the more refined MODES of publicly being with one another, but is likewise germane to those possibilities of concern which are restricted within definite ranges, and which are cut to the measure of one’s occupation, one’s social status, or one’s age. But the very meaning of such representation is such that it is always a representation ‘in’ (“in” und “bei”) something – that is to say, in concerning oneself with something. But proximally and for the most part everyday Dasein understands itself in terms of that with which it is customarily concerned. ‘One is’ what one does. In relation to this sort of Being (the everyday manner in which we join with one another in absorption in the ‘world’ of our concern) representability is not only quite possible but is even constitutive for our being with one another. Here one Dasein can and must, within certain limits, ‘be’ another Dasein. (SZ:240) BTMR §47

By none of these MODES of ending can death be suitably characterized as the “end” of Dasein. If dying, as Being-at-an-end, were understood in’ the sense of an ending of the kind we have discussed, then Dasein would thereby be treated as something present-at-hand or ready-to-hand. In death, Dasein has not been fulfilled nor has it simply disappeared; it has not become finished nor is it wholly at one’s disposal as something ready-to-hand. BTMR §48

Everyday common sense first takes ‘Being-guilty’ in the sense of ‘owing’, of ‘having something due on account’. One is to give back to the Other something to which the latter has a claim. This ‘Being-guilty’ as ‘having debts’ (“Schulden haben”) is a way of Being with Others in the field of concern, as in providing something or bringing it along. Other MODES of such concern are: depriving, borrowing, withholding, taking, stealing – failing to satisfy, in some way or other, the claims which Others have made as to their possessions. This kind of Being-guilty is related to that with which one can concern oneself. (SZ:282) BTMR §58

The primordial phenomenon of temporality will be held secure by demonstrating that if we have regard for the possible totality, unity, and development of those fundamental structures of Dasein which we have hitherto exhibited, these structures are all to be conceived as at bottom ‘temporal’ and as MODES of the temporalizing of temporality. Thus, when temporality has been laid bare, there arises for the existential analytic the task of repeating our analysis of Dasein in the sense of Interpreting its essential structures with regard to their temporality. The basic directions of the analyses thus required are prescribed by temporality itself. Accordingly the chapter will be divided as follows: anticipatory resoluteness as the way in which Dasein’s potentiality-for-Being-a-whole has existentiell authenticity (Section 62); the hermeneutical Situation at which we have arrived for Interpreting the meaning of the Being of care, and the methodological character of the existential analytic in general (Section 63); care and Selfhood (Section 64); temporality as the ontological meaning of care (Section 65); Dasein’s temporality and the tasks arising therefrom of repeating the existential analysis in a primordial manner (Section 66). (SZ:305) BTMR §61

Taken strictly, “meaning” signifies the “upon-which” of the primary projection of the understanding of Being. When Being-in-the-world has been disclosed to itself and understands the Being of that entity which it itself is, it understands equiprimordially the Being of entities discovered within-the-world, even if such Being has not been made a theme, and has not yet even been differentiated into its primary MODES of existence and Reality. All ontical experience of entities – both circumspective calculation of the ready-to-hand, and positive scientific cognition of the presentat-hand – is based upon projections of the Being of the corresponding entities – projections which in every case are more or less transparent. But in these projections there lies hidden the “upon-which”, of the projection; and on this, as it were, the understanding of Being nourishes itself. BTMR §65

Temporality ‘is’ not an entity at all. It is not, but it temporalizes itself. Nevertheless, we cannot avoid saying, ‘Temporality “is”… . the meaning of care’, ‘Temporality “is” … defined in such and such a way’; the reason for this can be made intelligible only when we have clarified the idea of Being and that of the ‘is’ in general. Temporality temporalizes, and indeed it temporalizes possible ways of itself. These make possible the multiplicity of Dasein’s MODES of Being, and especially the basic possibility of authentic or inauthentic existence. BTMR §65

In enumerating the ecstases, we have always mentioned the future first. We have done this to indicate that the future has a priority in the ecstatical unity of primordial and authentic temporality. This is so, even though temporality does not first arise through a cumulative sequence of the ecstases, but in each case temporalizes itself in their equiprimordiality. But within this equiprimordiality, the MODES of temporalizing are different. The difference lies in the fact that the nature of the temporalizing can be determined primarily in terms of the different ecstases. Primordial and authentic temporality temporalizes itself in terms of the authentic future and in such a way that in having been futurally, it first of all awakens the Present. The primary phenomenon of primordial and authentic temporality is the future. The priority of the future will vary according to the ways in which the temporalizing of inauthentic temporality itself is modified, but it will still come to the fore even in the derivative kind of ‘time’. BTMR §65

The temporal Interpretation of everyday Dasein must start with those structures in which disclosedness constitutes itself: understanding, state-of-mind, falling, and discourse. The MODES in which temporality temporalizes are to be laid bare with regard to these phenomena, and will give us a basis for defining the temporality of Being-in-the-world. This leads us back to the phenomenon of the world, and permits us to delimit the specifically temporal problematic of worldhood. This must be confirmed by characterizing that kind of Being-in-the-world which in an everyday manner is closest to us – circumspective, falling concern. The temporality of this concern makes it possible for circumspection to be modified into a perceiving which looks at things, and the theoretical cognition which is grounded in such perceiving. The temporality of Being-in-the-world thus emerges, and it turns out, at the same time, to be the foundation for that spatiality which is specific for Dasein. We must also show the temporal Constitution of deseverance and directionality. Taken as a whole, these analyses will reveal a possibility for the temporalizing of temporality in which Dasein’s inauthenticity is ontologically grounded; and they will lead us face to face with the question of how the temporal character of everydayness – the temporal meaning of the phrase ‘proximally and for the most part’, which we have been using constantly hitherto – is to be understood. By fixing upon this problem we shall have. made it plain that the clarification of this phenomenon which we have so far attained is insufficient, and we shall have shown the extent of this insufficiency. (SZ:335) BTMR §67

Although both fear and anxiety, as MODES of state-of-mind, are grounded primarily in having been, they each have different sources with regard to their own temporalization in the temporality of care. Anxiety springs from the future of resoluteness, while fear springs from the lost Present, of which fear is fearfully apprehensive, so that it falls prey to it more than ever. BTMR §68

How are we to obtain the right point of view for analysing the temporality of concern? We have called concernful Being alongside the ‘world’ our “dealings in and with the environment”. As phenomena which are examples of Being alongside, we have chosen the using, manipulation, and producing of the ready-to-hand, and the deficient and undifferentiated MODES of these; that is, we have chosen ways of Being alongside what belongs to one’s everyday needs. In.this kind of concern Dasein’s authentic existence too maintains itself, even when for such existence this concern is ‘a matter of indifference’. The ready-to-hand things with which we concern ourselves are not the causes of our concern, as if this were to arise only by the effects of entities within-the-world. Being alongside the ready-to-hand cannot be explained ontically in terms of the ready-to-hand itself, nor can the ready-to-hand be derived contrariwise from this kind of Being. But neither are concern, as a kind of Being which belongs to Dasein, and that with which we concern ourselves, as something ready-to-hand within-the-world, just present-at-hand together. All the same, a ‘connection’ subsists between them. That which is dealt with, if rightly understood, sheds light upon concernful dealings themselves. And furthermore, if we miss the phenomenal structure of what is dealt with, then we fail to recognize the existential constitution of dealing. Of course we have already made an essential gain for the analysis of those entities which we encounter as closest to us, if their specific character as equipment does not get passed over. But we must understand further that concernful dealings never dwell with any individual item of equipment. Our using and manipulating of any definite item of equipment still remains oriented towards some equipmental context. If, for instance, we are searching for some equipment which we have ‘misplaced’, then what we have in mind is not merely what we are searching for, or even primarily this; nor do we have it in mind in an isolated ‘act’; but the range of the equipmental totality has already been discovered beforehand. Whenever we ‘go to work’ and seize hold of something, we do not push out from the “nothing” and come upon some item of equipment which has been presented to us in isolation; in laying hold of an item of equipment, we come back to it from whatever work-world has already been disclosed. BTMR §69

The making-present which awaits and retains, is constitutive for that familiarity in accordance with which Dasein, as Being-with-one-another, ‘knows its way about’ (sich “auskennt”) in its public environment. Letting things be involved is something which we understand existentially as a letting-them-‘be’ (ein “Sein”-lassen). On such a basis circumspection can encounter the ready-to-hand as that entity which it is. Hence we can further elucidate the temporality of concern by giving heed to those MODES of circumspectively letting something be encountered which we have characterized above as “conspicuousness”, “obtrusiveness”, and “obstinacy”. Thematical perception of Things is precisely not the way equipment ready-to-hand is encountered in its ‘true “in-itself”’; it is encountered rather in the inconspicuousness of what we can come across ‘obviously’ and ‘Objectively’. But if there is something conspicuous in the totality of such entities, this implies that the equipmental totality as such is obtruding itself along with it. What sort of existential structure must belong to letting things be involved, if such a procedure can let something be encountered as conspicuous? This question is now aimed not at those factical occasions which turn our attention to something already presented, but rather at the ontological meaning of the fact that it can thus be turned. BTMR §69

To determine the nature of the res corporea ontologically, we must explicate the substance of this entity as a substance – that is, its substantiality. What makes up the authentic Being-in-itself (An-ihm-selbstsein) of the res corporea? How is it at all possible to grasp a substance as such, that is, to grasp its substantiality? “Et quidem ex quolibet attributo substantia cognoscitur; sed una tamen est cuiusque substantiae praecipua proprietas, quae ipsius naturam essentiamque constituit, et ad quam aliae omnes referuntur.” Substances become accessible in their ‘attributes’, and every substance has some distinctive property from which the essence of the substantiality of that definite substance can be read off. Which property is this in the case of the res corporea? “Nempe extensio in longum, latum et profundum, substantiae corporeae naturam constituit.” Extension – namely, in length, breadth, and thickness – makes up the real Being of that corporeal substance which we call the ‘world’. What gives the extensio this distinctive status? “Nam omne aliud quod corpori tribui potest, extensionem praesupponit …” Extension is a state-of-Being constitutive for the entity we are talking about; it is that which must already ‘be’ before any other ways in which Being is determined, so that these can ‘be’ what they are. Extension must be ‘assigned’ (“zugewiescn”) primarily to the corporeal Thing. The ‘world’s”extension and substantiality (which itself is characterized by extension) are accordingly demonstrated by showing how all the other characteristics which this substance definitely possesses (especially divisio, figura, motus), can be conceived only as MODI of extensio, while, on the other hand, extensio sine figura vel motu remains quite intelligible. BTMR §19

Thus a corporeal Thing that maintains its total extension can still undergo many changes in the ways in which that extension is distributed in the various dimensions, and can present itself in manifold shapes as one and the same Thing. “… atque unum et idem corpus, retinendo suam eandem quantitaterh, pluribus diversis MODIS potest extendi: nunc scilicet magis secundum longitudinem, minusque secundum latitudinem vel profunditatem, ac paulo post e contra magis secundum latitudinem, et minus secundum longitudinem.” BTMR §19

Descartes knows very well that entities do not proximally show themselves in their real Being. What is ‘proximally’ given is this waxen Thing which is coloured, flavoured, hard, and cold in definite ways, and which gives off its own special sound when struck. But this is not of any importance ontologically, nor, in general, is anything which is given through the senses. “Satis erit, si advertamus sensuum fiercefitiones non referri, nisi ad istam corporis humani cum mente coniunctionem, et nobis quidem ordinarie exhibere, quid ad illam externa corpora prodesse possint aut nocere …” The senses do not enable us to cognize any entity in its Being; they merely serve to announce the ways in which ‘external’ Things within-the-world are useful or harmful for human creatures encumbered with bodies. “… non … nos docere, qualia in seipsis existant”; they tell us nothing about entities in their Being. “Quod agentes, percipiemus naturam materiae, sive corporis in universum spectati, non consistere in eo quod sit res dura, vel ponderosa, vel colorata, (SZ:97) vel alio aliquo MODO sensus afficiens : sed tantum in eo quod sit res extensa in longtim, latum et proftindum.” BTMR §21

Dasein’s ontico-ontological priority was seen quite early, though Dasein itself was not grasped in its genuine ontological structure, and did not even become a problem in which this structure was sought. Aristotle says: he psyche ta onta pos estin. “Man’s soul is, in a certain way, entities.” The ‘soul’ which makes up the Being of man has aisthesis and noesis among its ways of Being, and in these it discovers all entities, both in the fact that they are, and in their Being as they are – that is, always in their Being. Aristotle’s principle, which points back to the ontological thesis of Parmenides, is one which Thomas Aquinas has taken Up in a characteristic discussion. Thomas is engaged in the task of deriving the ‘transcendentia’ – those characters of Being which lie beyond every possible way in which an entity may be classified as coming under some generic kind of subject-matter (every MODUS specialis entis), and which belong necessarily to anything, whatever it may be. Thomas has to demonstrate that the verum is such a transcendens. He does this by invoking an entity which, in accordance with its very manner of Being, is properly suited to ‘come together with’ entities of any sort whatever. This distinctive entity, the ens quod natum est convenire cum omni ente, is the soul (anima). Here the priority of ‘Dasein’ over all other entities emerges, although it has not been ontologically clarified. This priority has obviously nothing in common with a vicious subjectivizing of the totality of entities. BTMR §4

Shape is a MODUS of extensio, and so is motion: for motus is grasped only “si de nullo nisi locali cogitemus, ac de vi a qua excitatur … non inquiramus.” If the motion is a property of the res corporea, and a property which is, then in order for it to be experienceable in its Being, it must be conceived in terms of the Being of this entity itself, in terms of extensio; this means that it must be conceived as mere change of location. So nothing like ‘force’ counts for anything in determining what the Being of this entity is. (SZ:91) BTMR §19