Hingabe, dévouement, application, dedicação, dedication
In his earliest phenomenological efforts (beginning in 1919), Heidegger attempted to develop a “pre-theoretical science” (GA56/57:63) of “hermeneutical intuition” (117) that would give access to a pre-ontological dimension — or what Heidegger then calls “the pre-theoretical something” (das vortheoretische Etwas) that gets covered up by the hardened traditional categories of theory. By holding itself back to the level of “formal indication,” rather than attempting a reduction of phenomena to the grasp of concepts, phenomenology would let the “immediacy of everyday Dasein” show itself through the cracks of hardened traditional concepts, concepts which are imposed not only at the level of theory but which already pervade what Heidegger will come to call the inauthentic everydayness of das (27) Man. In an effort to get back to the things themselves in a way that discloses with minimal imposition of concepts, Heidegger adopted (through Emil Lask) an idea from the mystics: Hingabe, or “dedicative submission” (61).
Hingabe would indicate the radical act of giving oneself over to the things themselves; but it is an “act” which would paradoxically require the restraint of all (willful) acting on the subject’s part in order to let things show themselves. As John van Buren points out, “the mystical overtones of Meister Eckhart’s Gelassenheit, abandonment, releasement, letting-be” can be heard resonating in this phenomenological Hingabe? As in the case of Gelassenheit, the (non)act of Hingabe requires both a negative restraining moment, a releasement-from, and a positive moment, a releasement-to, in order to let beings be. One perhaps cannot help but wonder here to what extent Heidegger’s later turn to Gelassenheit might be interpreted as a return to this fundamental attunement of dedicative submission.
And yet Heidegger himself, it appears, increasingly came to find this attitude too passive; an openness to beings must be grounded with the resoluteness of authentic decision. The young Heidegger’s “Protestant turn” to a Paulian-inspired kairos, the existential Augenblick of decision, necessitated a turn away from the Stimmung of Gelassenheit understood as Hingabe. In fact, already in 1919 Heidegger was concerned with a certain tension in his phenomenology between “dedicative submission” (Hingabe) and “the scientific will to know”; that is to say, he was already struggling with “the constant tension between the higher receptivity of acknowledgement and the critical productivity of research.”4 The methodological question that Heidegger takes into Being and Time was, in Theodore Kisiel’s words:
Do we really apprehend, grasp, take . . . the immediacy of experience in its sense? (Or rather) instead of Hinsehen, a Hingabe, a receptive submission: heeding, and not looking, more of a suffering than an action? Or somewhere in the middle, that Greek voice which will continue to recur as Heidegger moves from Paul’s verbs of God to Aristotle’s search for a middle between passion and action?5
It is precisely the grammar of the middle voice on which Heidegger draws in Being and Time to depict the fundamental manner in which things show themselves; the task of the phenomenologist is to find the proper attunement and method with which to assist in letting these things show themselves from themselves. (Davis, 2007, p. 26-27)
VIDE: HyperHeidegger
VIDE: Hingabe
dévouement (EtreTemps)
dedication (BT)
inmersión, absorción (SZ)
NT: Dedication (Hingabe) to a matter, 136, 199, 347 (interested in), 354 (immersed in) (BT)
Hingabe (die): «inmersión», «absorción». Sich hingeben significa «entregarse a», «sumergirse en», «abandonarse a». En el contexto de la apropiación heideggeriana del término filosófico Hingabe acunado por Emil Lask, resulta preferible la traducción «inmersión» (o también «absorción») en vez de las otras opciones de tono más místico como «abandono», «entrega» o «disolución», que podrían hacer pensar erroneamente en la Gelassenheit («serenidad», «desasimiento») del Heidegger tardío. Lask utiliza el término Hingabe para describir nuestra experiencia inmediata de las formas de vida (como los valores) en las que ya estamos inmersos. El uso heideggeriano del término Hingabe refleja, sin duda, la influencia de Lask y de su principio de la determinación material de la forma. Según este principio, el conocimiento de los objetos no descansa tanto en la actividad reflexiva y teorética de un sujeto trascendental como en la existencia de un horizonte de sentido ya siempre comprendido previamente de manera preteorética y prerreflexiva. En las lecciones del semestre de posguerra de 1919, La idea de la filosofía y el problema de la concepción del mundo, Heidegger retoma esta idea laskiana a la hora de elaborar su propia comprensión fenomenológica de la «intuición»: se trata más de una inmersión arreflexiva, de una absorción atemática y preteorética (Hingabe) que de una contemplación reflexiva, de una mirada observadora y teorética (Hinsichtj. Cuando se pone en relación la «inmersión» (Hingabe) con ese otro modo de hacer frente a la realidad basado en la «contemplación» (Hinsicht), salta a la vista la importancia metodológica que posee esta dicotomia en la elaboración heideggeriana de la «intuición hermenéutica» (hermeneutische Intuition). Hinsehen es «mirar hacia algo», «poner la vista en», «inspeccionar», si bien Heidegger utiliza hinsehen en el sentido de «observar o contemplar algo en términos básicamente teoréticos». Esta forma de acercarse a la realidad no tiene nada que ver con el modo práctico e intuitivo de hacer frente a las situaciones que regularmente nos salen al encuentro en nuestra vida cotidiana. Nos hallamos, pues, ante dos modalidades de tratar con el mundo diametralmente opuestas: por una parte, una manera directa de entregarse a, simpatizar, contactar, sintonizar con la realidad inmediata del mundo circundante y, por otra, una manera indirecta, fundada, derivada que cristaliza en diferentes tipos de conocimiento teórico fruto de la contemplación. Véase la entrada complementaria Hinsicht (die), hinsehen. (GA56/57, pp. 61ss.) (LHDF)
Hingabe (devotion, dedication, submission, immersion) – Lask’s term to describe our immediate experience of forms of life (like values), in which we are already “given over” (hingegeben) to them, as a tacit intuition of the categorial dimension, is extended by Heidegger in KNS 1919 to include the more overt working “intuition” sought by the phenomenologist: a nonreflective categorial immersion or absorption (Hingabe) rather than an inspection (Hinsicht). But with the introduction of the tendency of ruination or falling in 1921-22, even the nonocular and empathetic Hingabe, “lost” as it is in absorbed immersion, is viewed with suspicion as a way to access to the “matters themselves.” (Kisiel)